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THE TRUTH ABOUT MASSIAH
James J. Tomkovicz*

Truth is a cherished value, an effective weapon, and a potent
symbol. In early childhood most of us are taught the importance of telling the truth.' Our leaders seek support by
accusing opponents of falsehood2 and promising always to tell
the truth.3 In one popular turn of phrase, truth is a coequal
with "justice" and "the American way,"4 and, in a well known
maxim, it is the force that "shall make you free."5 In ancient
and modern times, many have sung the praises of truth.' By

* Professor of Law, University of Iowa. B.A., University of Southern California,
1973; J.D., University of California at Los Angeles School of Law, 1976. I am
grateful to my research assistants, Eric Johnson, for his exceptionally high quality
work on this piece, and Rich Westphal, for his thoughtful review of the manuscript.
I am indebted to Yale Kamisar for recommending that I be invited to author a
response to the Massiah Report. And I am thankful to Jacki Williams for her terrific
administrative assistance.
1. The lesson was brought home to me by the pointed tale of honest young George
Washington and his "Icannot tell a lie" response to an inquiry about the chopping
down of his father's cherry tree. See M. WEEMS, THE LIFE OF WASHINGTON 12 (M.
Cunliffe ed. 1962) (9th ed. 1809). I presume the story is still used to illustrate the
importance of truth telling.
2. See, e.g., Barbanel, Roger Ailes: Master Maker of Political Fiery Darts, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 17, 1989, at B1, col. 2 ("Each candidate has portrayed the other as a
Pinocchio, with a nose that grows larger at every lie."); Harris, Beyer Blasts Dalton
Commercial on Taxes as a "DamnedLie," Washington Post, Oct. 26, 1989, at B8,
col. 3.
3. See, e.g., The Carter Phenomenon - It Was No Accident, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, May 17, 1976, at 15 (noting Jimmy Carter's campaign pledge - "I will never
lie to you"); Jenkins, Coleman Puts Accent on the Positive, Washington Post, Nov. 6,
1989, at B1l, col. 1 (reporting Virginia gubernatorial candidate J. Marshall
Coleman's statement - "I will always speak the truth").
4. Adventures of Superman (National Comics Publications 1957).
5. John 8:32 (King James).
6. ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE bk. I, ch. 6, at 8 (F. Peters
trans. 15th ed. 1893) ("[In the interests of truth we ought to sacrifice even what is
nearest to us . . . ."); R. BROWNING, Fifine at the Fair,stanza 32, in THE COMPLETE
POETICAL AND DRAMATIC WORKS OF ROBERT BROWNING 708 (Cambridge ed. 1895) ("So
absolutely good is truth, truth never hurts [t]he teller....."); G. CHAUCER, Truth, line
7, in THE POETICAL WORKS OF GEOFFREY CHAUCER 536 (F. Robinson 2d ed. 1957)
("[T]routhe thee shal delivere ... ."); I Esdras 4:41 (Apocrypha) (Revised Standard)
("Great is Truth, and strongest of all!"); M. GANDHI, GANDHI, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY:
THE STORY OF MY EXPERIMENTS WITH TRUTH 419 (M. Desai trans. 1949) ('[Tlhere is
no other God than Truth."); H. THOREAU, WALDEN 219 (New American Library ed.
1980) ("Rather than love, than money, than fame, give me truth."); L. TOLSTOY, WAR
AND PEACE 998 (C. Garnett trans. 1931) ("And there is no greatness where there is
not simplicity, goodness, and truth."); M. TWAIN, FOLLOWING THE EQUATOR 72 (1924)
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joining that chorus with its Truth in CriminalJustice Series,
the Department of Justice (DOJ) has all at once assumed the
defense of a revered value, availed itself of a mighty weapon,
and fortified itself with a powerful symbol. At the same time,
it has cast those who disagree in the uncomfortable roles of
opponents of truth.' For those accomplishments, the authors
of the Series deserve credit.
I give that credit somewhat grudgingly, for, as one whose
views of the Massiah8 right to counsel diametrically oppose
those expressed in the DOJ's Report on Massiah,9 I am among
those cast as enemies of truth. All else being equal, I would
rather have truth on my side.' °

("Truth is the most valuable thing we have. Let us economize it. -Pudd'nhead
Wilson's New Calendar."); Address by Martin Luther King, Jr., Nobel Peace Prize
Ceremony (Dec. 10, 1964), reprintedin MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 219 (F. Schulke ed.
1976) (I believe that unarmed truth and unconditional love will have the final word
in reality."). But see W. BLAKE, Auguries of Innocence, lines 53-54, in SELECTED
POEMS 133 (P. Butter ed. 1982) ('A truth that's told with bad intent [b]eats all the
[lies you can invent."); G. GREENE, THE HEART OF THE MATTER 59 (1948) ("The truth
has never been of any real value to any human being ....
In human relations
kindness and lies are worth a thousand truths."); W. SHAKESPEARE, Macbeth, act I,
scene iii, lines 123-24 (MacMillan Co. ed. 1890) ("And oftentimes, to win us to our
harm, the instruments of darkness tell us truths . . . ."); 1 TERENCE (PUBLIUS
TERENTIUS AFER), The Lady of Andros, act I, lines 67-69, in TERENCE 11 (J.
Sargeaunt trans. 1912) ("[C]omplaisance ... makes friends and truthfulness is the
mother of unpopularity.").
7. Moreover, truth is not the only "ideal" that those who disagree with the Series
must oppose. The "author" of the Series and proponent of truth is, after all, the
Department of Justice, and the doctrines that are the targets of their reports are
branded "obstructions of justice." See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERIES, REPORT No. 3, REPORT TO THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE SIxTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER THE
MASSIAH LINE OF CASES, reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 661, 706 (1989)
[hereinafter REPORT NO. 3, MASSIAH].
The position in which those who reach different conclusions find themselves seems
distinctly like the position of those whose first amendment understanding has led to
accusations of antipathy toward the American flag. See, e.g., Bishop, U.S. Judge
Strikes Down New Flag Law, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1990, at A10, col. 1; Crane, FlagburningBills Draw Support, Washington Times, Jan. 31, 1990, at B4, col. 3; Veterans
Attend Rally in Protest of Flag Burning, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1989, § 1, pt. 2, at 67,
col. 2. In part, the appropriate response is the same whether the accusation is
hostility to truth, to justice, or to the flag. It is fidelity to higher values, with no
animosity toward revered ideals and symbols, that has led to the controversial
conclusions.
8. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
9. See Tomkovicz, The Massiah Right to Exclusion: Constitutional Premises and
Doctrinal Implication, 67 N.C.L. REV. 751 (1989) [hereinafter Tomkovicz, Massiah
Exclusion]; Tomkovicz, An Adversary System Defense of the Right to CounselAgainst
Informants: Truth, FairPlay, and the Massiah Doctrine, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1
(1988) [hereinafter Tomkovicz, Defense of Massiah].
10.
"In general terms, truth commands a very high respect in our society. No one
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As a result, in responding to the Massiah Report my first
task was to decide how to deal with the "anti-truth" label.'1
The Report's skillful depiction of the Massiah right and
exclusionary rule as unsavory, indefensible characters made
the task a worthy challenge. 2 One simple alternative would
have been to renounce my prior views, and join the DOJ's
cause."3 I could not bring myself to do so, however, not only

can be heard to challenge judges when they pay homage to truth." Rifkind, The
Lawyer's Role and Responsibility in Modern Society, 30 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 534, 543
(1975). Although I am in general agreement with Judge Rifkind, as I have said
before, I am somewhat skeptical of those who claim sole possession of truth. See
Tomkovicz, Defense of Massiah, supra note 9, at 45; see also 5 G. BERKELEY, Siris, §
368, in THE WORKS OF GEORGE BERKELEY 164 (T. Jessop ed. 1953) ("Truth is the cry
of all, but the game of a few."); G. BYRON, DON JUAN, canto xi, stanza 37, at 406 (T.
Steffan, E. Steffan & W. Pratt rev. ed. 1982) ('And after all what is a lie? 'Tis but
[t]he truth in masquerade. .. ."); J. JOUBERT, PENSEES OF JOUBERT No. 164, at 46
(H. Attwell trans. 1896) ("It is even easier to be mistaken about the true than the
beautiful.").
11.
In deciding how to respond, I was not without guidance from on high. It is
not uncommon in criminal cases to find Justices of the Supreme Court doing battle
over the issue of truth and its significance in constitutional adjudication. Compare
James v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 648, 655-56 (1990) (noting that the truth-seeking
rationale that supports the use of illegally acquired evidence to impeach defendants
does not apply with equal force to the impeachment of other witnesses) with id. at
658 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the interest in truth seeking promoted by
impeachment of defendants is as strong in cases of impeachment of other witnesses)
and Perry v. Leeke, 109 S. Ct. 594, 600-01 (1989) (allowing the trial judge to bar
defendant and attorney from consulting during a brief recess promotes the search for
truth) with id. at 605 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ('The most troubling aspect of the
majority's opinion ... is its assertion that allowing a defendant to speak with his
attorney during a 'short' recess ...will retard the truth-seeking function of the trial
.... Central to our Sixth Amendment doctrine is the understanding that legal
representation ... enhances the discovery of truth . . ").
12.
Professor Grano's description of the Truth in Criminal Justice Series as a 'new
...voice" might suggest that the Justice Department's views are original or novel.
Grano, Introduction-TheChanged and ChangingWorld of ConstitutionalCriminal
Procedure:The Contribution of the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Policy,
22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 395, 401 (1989). At least with regard to Massiah, that
suggestion is insupportable. Virtually every argument and criticism leveled
against Massiah in the Report has been voiced before in dissenting opinions of
Supreme Court Justices. See, e.g., Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 181 (1985)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 289-90 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Massiah, 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964) (White, J.,
dissenting); see also Tomkovicz, Defense of Massiah, supra note 9, at 25-27. What
the DOJ has done with consummate skill is to gather together all the anti-Massiah
strands and weave them into a powerful and logically organized assault on the
doctrine.
13.
Professor Grano confesses that he once defended the constitutionality of
Massiah, but has since been persuaded that it is constitutionally indefensible. See
Grano, supra note 12, at 410 n.70 (1989). Indeed, Professor Grano has become a most
enthusiastic convert, explicitly adopting the tactic of accusing opponents of opposition
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because of the investment of self in two recent articles, but
because I remain persuaded-not certain, but persuaded-that
the positions I espoused are valid. Two other extreme alternatives would have been to accept the "opponent of truth" label
without resistance or to deny categorically that I harbor any
hostility to truth. Neither alternative, however, would have
14
been honest, for I am a "qualified" opponent of truth.
Although I sometimes espouse positions that impede the
pursuit of truth, I often advocate truth in criminal justice and
ardently defend other kinds of truth.
Ultimately, it seemed that the best policy would be to face,
not run from, the truth. I intend to disclose fully my views
concerning the importance of truth in criminal justice, and to
explain how my views differ from those of the Justice Department. I also intend to wield the sword of truth myself. In a
discussion that, I hope, will be at least as honest and accurate
as it is clever, I will suggest that insofar as I am against truth
in criminal justice, that opposition is the unavoidable product
of a reasoned search for another truth-what I will call "truth
in constitutional law." I am an enemy of one truth only
because I aspire to be an ally of the other. 5
Initially, the analysis will focus on the ramifications of the
Department of Justice's determined reliance upon truth in
criminal justice. The Department's emphasis upon truth,'6
the tone and nature of the Report, and some of Professor
Grano's comments on the rhetoric of "liberal" scholarship

to the truth. See id. at 405 ("Apparently, however, a view has taken hold that
facilitating the discovery of truth is itself an evil ....
Purging the influence of such
misguided thinking from our system is a necessary first step to accomplishing serious
reform."). Although I am more than a little wary of converts who call for purges, I
am hopeful that Professor Grano's previous conversion and confession of error
indicates that he is open-minded and receptive to further persuasion.
14.
Moreover, to accept completely the adversary's label would have been
unpalatable to my lawyerly soul.
15.
Undoubtedly, those who disagree with my reading of the sixth amendment
right to counsel and my consequent defense of the Massiah right also can legitimately
claim to be in pursuit of constitutional truth. I would neither dispute their claim, nor
claim a monopoly on truth. My suggestion at this point is only that those of us who
disagree with the views expressed in the Truth in Criminal Justice Series can
honestly avow that our resistance to truth in criminal justice is engendered by our
search for other truths. I will develop this point at greater length later. See infra
notes 129-142 and accompanying text.
16.
The emphasis is evident in the title chosen for the entire Series, a most
accurate reflection of its theme.
17.
E.g., Grano, supra note 12, at 398 n.12, 401 n.26.
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have prompted me to reflect on the character of legal scholarship. I will then pursue two additional goals: (1) formulating
and presenting plausible responses to the substantive attack
on Massiah in the Report, and (2) explaining the alternative
constitutional vision that has persuaded me to defend the
Massiah right. Those objectives will necessitate some exploration of the meaning of the right to counsel and its role in
Massiah contexts."' The simple aims of the discussion are to
clarify the opposing views of Massiah, to illuminate the values
underlying those views, and thereby to promote informed
decisions regarding the legitimacy of Massiah.9
First, the Article will summarize the Justice Department's
discussion of the Massiah right to counsel and the exclusion
of evidence under Massiah.20
Next, it will evaluate the
nature of the Report and the character of legal scholarship. 2 '
Finally, it will explore the substantive debate over Massiah.2 2
In that section, the Article will point out the matters on which
the DOJ and I agree, will attempt to frame the fundamental
questions raised by the Massiah doctrine, and will investigate
potential sources of answers to those constitutional questions.
Ultimately, it will provide the answers that I prefer, explaining the premises that lead to those answers and how they
differ from the premises underlying the Report.2 3

18.
However, because I have discussed the same issues at length in my previous
works, supra note 9, my responses to the Justice Department's arguments and my
explanations of the constitutional premises that can support the Massiah right will
not be exhaustive.
19.
At the end of his Introduction to the Series, Professor Grano observes that the
Department of Justice has "rendered a significant contribution... by showing us
that we do have a rather clear choice." Grano, supra note 12, at 424. Although I
agree that the DOJ does describe the alternatives to Massiah, and, in that sense,
clarifies the choices, the Report is anything but a rational, neutral piece of
scholarship that gives contrary views their due. The advocative tone of the
Report-its one-sided and rhetorical character-obscures, rather than clarifies, the
real value choices that underlie the debate over Massiah.
One reason that those choices need clarification is that the Supreme Court has
done an abominable job of explaining the premises of Massiah. See Tomkovicz,
Defense of Massiah, supra note 9, at 8-9, 22, 30. My objective is to illuminate all of
the significant choices that underlie the ultimate decision to accept or reject Massiah.
20.
See infra Part I.
21.
See infra Part II.A.
22.
See infra Part II.B.
23.
Although the specific discussions in this piece are addressed to the issues
raised by the Report, my reflections upon the character of the Report and the general
premises upon which the DOJ grounds its reasoning undoubtedly are pertinent to the
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SUMMARY OF THE

TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERIES'
MASSIAH REPORT

24
The Massiah Report discusses both the right to counsel
accorded by the Massiah doctrine and the exclusion of evidence 25 by virtue of failures to respect that right. 26 The
DOJ concedes that, unlike the Miranda27 protections, the
Supreme Court's Massiah entitlement to counsel is not
thought to be a mere prophylactic device designed to safeguard
constitutional rights. 28 Rather, it is an integral part of the
sixth amendment right. 29 The DOJ maintains, however, that
the Court has failed to justify Massiah or to respond to the
criticisms leveled against it. 30 The essence of the DOJ's
evaluation of Massiah is reflected in the declarations that the
right has "no support in history, logic, or considerations of
sound public policy,"3 1 and that there is "no basis for
Massiah's automatic exclusionary rule."32 According to the

other Reports in the Series.
24.
REPORT No. 3, MASSIAH, supra note 7, at 684-91.
25.
Id. at 691-96.
26.
Unless a contrary intent appears from the language, references to Massiah
or the Massiah right are meant to include both the entitlement to the pretrial
assistance of counsel and the exclusion of evidence that results from the denial of
that assistance.
27.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
28.
See REPORT No. 3, MASSIAH, supra note 7, at 696-97 (arguing that although
Mirandacreated a "remedial ...measure[]," Massiah created a constitutional right).
But see United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 289 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that the majority's interpretation and application of the Massiah doctrine
"rests on a prophylactic application of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel").
29.
See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985) (holding that the sixth amendment is violated when the state obtains incriminating statements in knowing
circumvention of right to counsel); id. at 177 n.13 (stating that the accused had a
constitutionalright not to reveal information to the state). Nevertheless, according
to Professor Grano it is "as indefensible as Miranda." Grano, supra note 12, at 409.
30.
See REPORT NO. 3, MASSIAH, supra note 7, at 684, 691, and 706. In these
respects, the DOJ and I agree. See supra note 19.
31.
REPORT No. 3, MASSIAH, supra note 7, at 664. This refrain is similar to the
suggestions of Supreme Court dissenters that Massiah has no foundation in the
language, history, or objectives of the sixth amendment. See, e.g., Henry, 447 U.S.
at 295-96, 300-01 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 49697 (1964) (White, J., dissenting); see also Tomkovicz, Defense of Massiah, supra note
9, at 25-27.
32.
REPORT No. 3, MASSIAH, supra note 7, at 665. Supreme Court dissenters also
oppose the exclusion of evidence under Massiah and agree with the DOJ that it is a
judicially created enforcement mechanism, not a constitutional right. See, e.g.,
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DOJ, Massiah reflects not a legitimate interpretation of the
sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel, but a "new
constitutional right" created by the liberal Warren Court,33
a "right not to be questioned in the absence of counsel"3 4 that
aborts the search for truth3 5 and obstructs justice.3 6
A. The History of the Right to Counsel

The Report asserts that the history of the right to counsel
that was incorporated into the sixth amendment provides no
support for the pretrial right against deliberate elicitation of
incriminating statements recognized by the Massiah doctrine.3 7 According to the DOJ, the debates over the Bill of
Rights "shed no light" on the specific congressional understanding of the meaning of the right to counsel. 38 The logical
assumption, therefore, is that the intent was to provide a right
to counsel with the same substance as the right recognized at
common law and by the individual states. 39 A "critical
aspect" of the "original understanding" of that right is that it
was restricted to an entitlement to "counsel for the purpose of
4"
assisting in presenting a defense at trial."
No historical
evidence suggests that the framers intended to provide a
pretrial right to counsel of any kind, much less one that would
operate outside of formal judicial contexts.4 Consequently,
the clear message of history is that the pretrial Massiah right
is not a part of the sixth amendment guarantee.4 2

Moulton, 474 U.S. at 191-92 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Henry, 447 U.S. at 296
(Rehnquist, J. dissenting); see also Tomkovicz, Massiah Exclusion, supra note 6, at
762-65.
33.
REPORT No. 3, MASSIAH, supra note 7, at 663.
34.
Id. at 671; see also id. at 665, 705.
35.
Id. at 663, 706.
36.
Id. at 706.
37.
Id. at 684-85.
38.
Id. at 673.
39.
Id.
40.
Id.
41.
Id. at 673-74, 684-85. According to the DOJ, "[t]he Founders simply did not
contemplate a right to counsel prior to trial, perhaps because they saw no need for
such a right." Id. at 684-85.
42.
According to the DOJ, the "lack of historical basis" is the Massiah doctrine's
"most obvious flaw." Id. at 684.
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B. The Logic of the Sixth Amendment

The Report also alleges that Massiah can find no support in
"logic." 43 The fundamental logical deficiency of the Massiah
doctrine is that the right it recognizes is neither necessitated
by, nor consistent with, the sixth amendment's purposes or the
roles and functions of counsel in ensuring that those purposes
are achieved.44 The sixth amendment's core historical purposes are to ensure "the fairness of trials and the integrity of
the truth-finding process.""5 In part, the sixth amendment
aims to promote those goals by "equalizing the strength of the
adversaries" in the criminal trial. 46 Traditionally, counsel's
equalizing assistance has consisted of "prepar[ing] the
accused's defense and ...act[ing] as his advocate in encounters with the government at which the case is advanced
toward disposition or at which the reliability of the truthfinding process might be unfairly undermined." 47 According
to the Justice Department, counsel provides the expertise
essential to handling legal questions and to coping with the
advocacy of the professionally trained government prosecutor. 8
The Report acknowledges that the sixth amendment's
historical purposes and the traditional role of defense counsel
explain the extension of the right to counsel to formal pretrial
proceedings,49 such as preliminary hearings,5 ° and to informal pretrial proceedings, 5 ' such as lineups.52 The Court's
decisions extending sixth amendment protection to these
contexts are premised on the belief that the assistance of
counsel is logically important to ensure that the right to
counsel at trial is not impaired or undermined before the trial

43. Id. at 685-88.
44. Id. at 685.
45. Id. at 664.
46. Id. at 685.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 664. This same conception of the roles and functions of counsel has
found expression in majority opinions of the Supreme Court. See Moran v. Burbine,
475 U.S. 412, 430 (1986); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309, 313 (1973). Like
the DOJ, Massiah dissenters have invoked this conception of counsel as a basis for
attacks on the doctrine. See Tomkovicz, Defense of Massiah, supra note 9, at 26.
See REPORT No. 3, MASSIAH, supra note 7, at 685.
49.
See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
50.
51.
See REPORT No. 3, MASSIAH, supra note 7, at 674.
52. See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967).
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phase is reached.5 3 The Report concludes that the sixth
amendment's purposes and counsel's traditional functions,
however, cannot explain the Massiah doctrine's extension of
counsel to informal contexts involving no perceptible threats
of unfairness or unreliability. 4 Typical Massiah situations
involve government informants surreptitiously and deliberately eliciting voluntary inculpatory statements from defendants.5 5 According to the Report, those situations are wholly
devoid of legal complexities, the expert advocacy of a prosecutor, and any factors that might produce unreliable evidence.5 6
Consequently, there are no legitimate functions to be served
by counsel in Massiah contexts. The core purposes of the sixth
amendment-fairness and the integrity of the truth-finding
processes-are not imperiled and need no protector.5 7
According to the DOJ, the Massiah decision created, and
its progeny have perpetuated, novel sixth amendment
entitlements. Those entitlements include protection against
"being questioned-overtly or covertly-by government agents
in the absence of counsel concerning an offense that has led to
...indictment,"" and insulation "from the consequences of
uncounseled but voluntary statements whether or not their
admission would impair the fairness of the trial or the

53.
See REPORT No. 3, MASSIAH, supra note 7, at 674-76. Although the Report
acknowledges the Court's reasoning, it is far from clear that the DOJ agrees with any
pretrial extensions of counsel. The Report states that
Supreme Court decisions have transformed the sixth amendment's "Assistance
of Counsel" clause from a simple guarantee of the aid of retained counsel at trial
into a requirement that counsel be available to protect the defendant's interests
in a variety of pretrial contexts. The decisions have generally attempted to
justify this metamorphosison the theory that representation by counsel during
pretrial confrontations between the accused and his accusers is necessary to
ensure the fairness and integrity of the trial itself.
Id. at 674-75 (emphasis added). Perhaps I am guilty of misinterpretation, but from
the language chosen, coupled with the earlier emphasis that the sixth amendment
right was originally conceived of and intended solely as a trial right., id. at 673-74,
I sense a preference for restricting counsel to the trial phase alone.
54.
Id. at 685-86. These arguments also track those made by Massiah opponents
on the Court. See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 296, 299 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Tomkovicz, Defense of Massiah, supra note 9, at
26-27.
55.
See, e.g., Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986); Maine v. Moulton, 474
U.S. 159 (1985); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). For a summary of
the current scope of the Massiah right, see Tomkovicz, Defense of Massiah, supra note
9, at 15-22.
56.
See REPORT No. 3, MASSIAH, supra note 7, at 685-87.
57.
Id. at 685-86; Tomkovicz, Defense of Massiah, supra note 9, at 26.
58.
REPORT No. 3, MASSIAH, supra note 7, at 683.
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integrity of the truth-finding process."59 Those entitlements
are not logical extensions necessary to safeguard the right to
trial counsel. Rather, they are constitutional excrescences the
abrogation of which would not threaten the trial right at the
sixth amendment's core.6"
According to the DOJ, it is not logical to reason that
Massiah guards against unfairness by protecting against
"deception" that "prevent[s] a defendant.., from recognizing
his possible need to avail himself of "6 the right to counsel.
That reasoning "begs the question" by assuming "a right not
to have the government attempt to obtain incriminating
information from [an accused] except with the consent, or in
the presence, of his attorney."6 2 The Report concludes that
because there is no such right, "there is no 'unfairness' in ...
impair[ing] its exercise. "'

C. The Public Policy Ramifications of Massiah

The Report argues that the lack of support in the history or
the logic of the sixth amendment demonstrates that Massiah
is "merely a cover for a judicially-imposed policy," and an

59.
Id. The DOJ maintains that because compulsion is lacking in Massiah
situations, counsel is not necessary to safeguard the values of the fifth amendment
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Id. at 686. I agree with that
assertion. See Tomkovicz, Defense of Massiah, supra note 9, at 39 n.182.
60.
See REPORT No. 3, MAssiAH, supra note 7, at 666, 668, 696, 705.
61.
Id. at 687.
62.
Id. at 688.
63.
Id. The Justice Department believes that certain holdings of the Supreme
Court undermine the contention that Massiah is rooted in the need for protection
against governmental "deception." Both Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459
(1986) (stating that Massiah requires active elicitation and does not govern passive
listening), and Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 n.16 (1985) (noting that, despite
pending charges, Massiah permits the government to elicit and use information
pertaining to separate, uncharged offenses), are said to belie the notion that Massiah
protects against deception. See REPORT No. 3, MASSLAH, supra note 7, at 688 n.75.
I have discussed elsewhere whether Wilson and Moulton can be reconciled with a
constitutionally defensible rationalization of the Massiah right to counsel. See
Tomkovicz, Defense of Massiah, supra note 9, at 77-90. For present purposes, suffice
it to say that the fact that a specific Supreme Court holding is not consistent with a
potential explanation of Massiah's constitutional roots is not a necessarily persuasive
reason for rejecting that explanation. It is entirely possible that a Supreme Court
that has failed to proffer an adequate justification for the Massiah right, see supra
note 19, has made mistakes in defining the boundaries of that right.
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"unwise" one at that.'
The policy choices reflected in
Massiah are allegedly unsound for four basic reasons.6 5
First, Massiah prevents conviction of the guilty by foreclosing
efforts to gather evidence that may be essential to proving the
government's case beyond a reasonable doubt.6 6 In some
cases, charges are filed on the basis of probable cause, but
with insufficient proof to convict. 7 After such charges are
filed, Massiah cuts off access to highly probative information
concerning guilt.
Second, Massiah poses threats to public safety.6" In response to Massiah's prohibition, authorities may attempt to
ensure sufficient opportunity to elicit evidence from suspects
by delaying the initiation of proceedings against them. When
government investigators conclude that it is a "reasonable
course" to postpone charges and leave a suspect at large, there
is always some risk that he will cause further societal
harm.6" In sum, Massiah may well induce investigators to
take certain risks with the public safety, risks that should not
be taken and are not constitutionally required.
Third, Massiah runs contrary to "society's strong interest in
. . the swift and effective operation of the criminal justice
system."7"
Voluntary inculpatory statements by accused
individuals are desirable and promote the expeditious and
efficient processing of criminal cases. 7 ' The demands of
Massiah are "virtually certain to ensure the making of no
statements at all," and, therefore, to deprive the system of fuel
needed to function well.7 2

64.
REPORT No. 3, MASSIAH, supra note 7, at 665.
65.
See id. at 688-90.
66.
See id. at 688-89.
67.
See id. at 689.
68.
See id.
69.
Id.
70.
Id.
71.
See id.
72.
Id. (footnote omitted). The DOJ claims that Massiah protection "may also be
harmful to some defendants, either because they will be subjected to trial on the
basis of marginal evidence of guilt, or because further investigation would have
exonerated them or at least persuaded the prosecutor not to bring them to trial." Id.
at 689 n.79. The argument is reminiscent of the Miranda dissenters' complaint that
innocent suspects can be seriously harmed by the protections afforded by the
Miranda doctrine. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 543-44 (1966) (White, J.,
dissenting). I must admit that my typical reaction to the argument that "we're
taking away your rights for your own good" is extreme skepticism. I sense that the
rights afforded by Massiah and Miranda are rarely harmful to defendants in the
ways suggested by the DOJ. More importantly, I am not the first to conclude that
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Finally, the ethical tenet prohibiting lawyers from talking to
uncounseled opposing parties does not provide a foundation for
Massiah. The terms of and reasons for that rule dictate that
it is applicable only to lawyers, not to investigators or informants.73

D. The Massiah Exclusionary Rule

The Report recognizes that certain language in the original
Massiah opinion suggests that the sixth amendment is
violated only at trial when inculpatory statements are used as
evidence.7 4
This Massiah language clearly implies that
exclusion is an integral part of the right to counsel that is the
foundation of the Massiah doctrine. 5 Certain later decisions,
however, reflect what the DOJ believes to be the undoubtedly
correct view that the sixth amendment is only concerned with
pretrial evidence gathering, not with what later happens in
court.7'6 That view leads to the critical, and sensible, conclu-

when the possibility of such harm arises, the individual can choose to avoid it by not
exercising her rights. The DOJ's argument suggests that we should rely on its
assessment that defendants are best served by the categorical suspension of constitutional safeguards. Considering the Justice Department's adversarial posture and our
respect for individual autonomy, it seems preferable to entrust such decisions
concerning defendants' best interests to defendants and their attorneys.
73.
See REPORT NO. 3, MASSIAH, supra note 7, at 689-90. The DOJ also points out
that England, "the common law jurisdiction most closely akin to our own," provides
no protection like that afforded by Massiah. Id. at 690. Because the British do "not
appear to countenance such an impediment to the search for truth in criminal cases,"
we Americans should not. Id.
74.
See id. at 691; see also Tomkovicz, Massiah Exclusion, supra note 6, at 763.
The Massiah language referred to by the DOJ strongly and unequivocally declares
that the accused "was denied the basic protections of [the sixth amendment] when
there was used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words."
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (emphasis added). Moreover,
Massiah is not the only opinion in which the Court has indicated that it is the use of
the accused's statements that violates the Constitution. See Maine v. Moulton, 474
U.S. 159, 161 (1985) (indicating that the question in the case is whether admission
at trial of uncounseled statements violated the defendant's sixth amendment right);
see also Tomkovicz, Massiah Exclusion, supra note 6, at 763-64 & n. 83.
75.
See REPORT No. 3, MASSIAH, supra note 7, at 691; Tomkovicz, Massiah
Exclusion, supra note 6, at 763.
76.
See REPORT NO. 3, MASSIAH, supra note 7, at 692-93 ("[S]ubsequent decisions
make it clear that what violates the sixth amendment in the Massiah sense is the use
of evidence gathering methods that frustrate an indicted defendant's right to the
assistance of counsel."); id. ("[Tihe constitutional violation involved in a Massiah-type
situation consists of post-indictment efforts by the government to secure incriminat-
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sion that the Massiah exclusionary rule is not constitutionally
required.
Rather, just like the fourth amendment and
Miranda exclusionary rules, it is no more than a "judiciallycreated device for enforcing a constitutional right."7 7
The Report contends that, as such a device, the Massiah
exclusionary rule is not justifiable on policy grounds. 8 Its
"unquestionably substantial" costs are the "impairment of the
truth-finding process," the "release or lenient treatment of
obviously guilty defendants," and the "generation of public
disrespect for [our] system." 9 Moreover, it yields minimal
benefits other than undesirable "windfalls" for guilty defendants.8 " In terms of deterring official illegality, "the gain to
society" from Massiah-based exclusion "is insubstantial, if it
exists at all."" According to the DOJ, the possible minimal
gains to society are not worth the "excessive costs of the
[Massiah] exclusionary rule approach."8 2 The judicially fashioned remedy of exclusion is every bit as indefensible as, and
even more vulnerable to attack than,8 3 the pretrial right to
counsel it is supposed to serve. 4 It ought to be abolished.
In sum, the Report accuses the Supreme Court of creating
an "irrational" and "subversive" constitutional right that has
resulted in an "anomalous situation" calling for radical

ing statements from the defendant in the absence of counsel, not of using the
statements so obtained at his trial."). But see Tomkovicz, Massiah Exclusion, supra
note 6, at 763-64 & n. 83.
77.
REPORT No. 3, MASSIAH, supra note 7, at 693.
78.
See id. at 693-96.
79.
Id. at 693.
80.
Id.
81.
Id. at 694.
82.
Id. at 696. Former Chief Justice Burger also believed that the Massiah
exclusionary rule's costs far outweighed its marginal benefits. See Maine v. Moulton,
474 U.S. 159, 191 (1985) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
83.
The DOJ is not at all sanguine about the likelihood that its arguments
against the Massiah right to counsel will prevail. See REPORT No. 3, MASSIAH, supra
note 7, at 696-98, 702. It does believe, however, that the Court could be persuaded
by its arguments for eliminating or modifying the Massiah exclusionary rule. Id. at
698-702. Its optimism in this respect seems partly based on the belief that the rule
is "not constitutionally required." Id. at 698. Professor Grano characterizes the
DOJ's "suggestion that the Massiah exclusionary rule, unlike the underlying
substantive right, may not be constitutionally based" as "provocative" and "deserv[ing
of] consideration." Grano, supra note 12, at 410. Nonetheless, unlike the authors of
Report Number Three, Professor Grano concludes that the DOJ's arguments against
the "substantive" Massiah right "may be more persuasive" than its arguments
against the exclusionary" 'remedy.' " Id. at 411.
84.
The DOJ also believes that the strong case against Massiah exclusion is
fortified by the fact that there are equally effective alternatives to ensure protection
of the Massiah right to counsel. See REPORT No. 3, MASSIAH, supra note 7, at 695-96.
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reform. 5 According to the Justice Department, Massiah is
an enigmatic doctrine that thwarts the search for truth and
obstructs justice.8 "
II. A CRITIQUE OF AND RESPONSE
TO THE MASSIAH REPORT

This Part first addresses the character of the Report and the
nature of legal scholarship. It then reflects upon the hazards
and unspoken ramifications of the Justice Department's
campaign for truth in criminal justice. Finally, it describes
the premises underlying the DOJ's opposition to Massiah and
the distinct premises that provide constitutional support for
Massiah.

A. The Massiah Report, Legal Scholarship,
and the Campaign for Truth in Criminal Justice

Three aspects of Professor Grano's powerful Introduction to
the Truth in Criminal Justice Series" inspired the present
discussion. First, Professor Grano generously praises the
Series as "vital,""" and as a "new, energetic, and serious voice
[that] should help provoke a more balanced and vigorous
competition of ideas ... essential for the testing of truth and
good in a free society." 9 Second, he pointedly criticizes the
"one-sided," liberal bent of most academic literature in the
criminal procedure area, suggesting that academia is beset by
a "philosophical imbalance.""
That imbalance has made
"conservatives .. . a discrete and insular minority," and has
infected the scholarship with a severe case of "inflated
rhetoric." 9 1
Finally, in defending his own position on
Massiah and the other doctrines targeted by the Series,
Professor Grano himself sanctions and indulges in the same

85.
86.

Id. at 696, 706.
See id. at 706.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See Grano, supra note 12.
Id. at 408.
Id. at 401; see also id. at 402, 424.
Id. at 398 n.12.
Id.; see also id. at 401 & n.26, 402.
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sorts of rhetorical excesses for which he chastises others.9 2
1. The Report as legal scholarship - Professor Grano
recognizes that the source, the intended audience, and the
immediate purpose of the Truth in Criminal Justice Series
could prompt readers (particularly the unsympathetic) to
dismiss it as legal advocacy that contributes little of a scholarly nature to the Massiah debate.9" He suggests that such a
dismissal would be a mistake because the Series contains
"careful and complete legal analysis" that deserves serious
consideration.9 4 Moreover, according to Professor Grano, the
advocative character of the Series hardly distinguishes it from
"much academic scholarship."9" For the most part, Professor
Grano's assessments are on target. The potential merits of
the Justice Department's analyses should not be ignored
simply because of their source or their objectives. And the
Series does have a lot in common with much traditional legal
scholarship.9 6

92.
See, e.g., id. at 404 ("Apparently... a view has taken hold that facilitating
the discovery of truth is itself an evil .... Purging the influence of such misguided
thinking from our system is a necessary first step .... "); id. at 408 ("Mirandamay
be a decision with a future.., far more frightening than its past."); id. at 413 (I find
it difficult to believe that we are so intellectually impoverished... that we lack the
capability of devising an effective, alternative approach.... [M]any who have grown
accustomed to the existing world, irrational as it may be, simply are incapable of
conceiving the reality of an American criminal justice system without an exclusionary
rule."); id. at 420 (referring to "the low regard our existing system has for truth,
finality, and rationality"); id. at 423 ("Those who can see only the existing world are
bound to decry the Office of Legal Policy proposals as frightening, extreme, and out
of the mainstream."); id. at 424 n. 144 ("The risk of serious mistake always is great
when the Supreme Court bases its decisions not on what the law actually requires
but on its idea of progress.").
93.
See id. at 411 n.76 (acknowledging that readers might have "legitimate concern
*. that the legal analysis may be in the nature more of a brief than an objective
inquiry").
94.
Id.
95.
Id.
96.
There are many varieties of legal scholarship. Throughout this discussion,
my focus and basis of comparison is the traditional, often doctrinal, variety with
which I am most familiar. See, e.g., Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974); Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah,
and Miranda: What is "Interrogation"?When Does it Matter?, 67 GEO. L.J. 1 (1978);
LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing Bright Lines
and Good Faith, 43 U. PIrr. L. REV. 307 (1982); White, Rhode Island v. Innis: The
Significance of a Suspect's Assertion of His Right to Counsel, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53
(1979). That is the form of scholarship with which the Truth in Criminal Justice
Series shares substantial common ground. The Reports probably have considerably
less in common with less traditional, contemporary strains of academic legal writing.
See, e.g., Kahn, Community in Contemporary ConstitutionalTheory, 99 YALE L.J. 1
(1989); Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1983);
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The Massiah Report is unlike typical legal scholarship
insofar as its author is an active party in interest in criminal
cases, and it is apparently addressed directly to the "leader"
of that party.9 7 As a result, in tone and design, the Report
is a highly and consistently argumentative call to action.9"
In part, it has the structure of a battle plan, complete with
"litigative," "legislative," "educational," "investigative," and
99
"administrative" strategies
and suggestions of pragmatic
compromises that are most-likely to be effective in eliminating
or restricting Massiah and its rule of exclusion.'00 Moreover,
the Report is characterized by extreme rhetoric' and by a

West, Critical Legal Studies and a Liberal Critic, 97 YALE L.J. 757 (1988); see also
CriticalLegal Studies Symposium, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984). I think it fair to say
that scholarship in the area of criminal procedure has by and large remained
relatively traditional.
97.
The Office of Legal Policy of the Department of Justice authored the Report,
and the DOJ is the federal prosecutor. As Professor Grano observes, the Reports are
'addressed to the Attorney General ultimately for the purpose of recommending
policy options for the Department of Justice." Grano, supra note 12, at 411 n.76.
98.
See, e.g., REPORT NO. 3, MASSIAH, supra note 7, at 666 ("The Department of
Justice should seek reform of the Massiah doctrine on the grounds that it is
irrational and harmful to effective law enforcement, as well as subversive of the
search for truth in criminal trials."); id. at 702 ("[T]he Department should continue
to avail itself of litigative opportunities to express its fundamental disagreement
[with Massiah]."); id. at 705 ("It would be desirable for the Department, therefore, to
undertake a 'consciousness raising' program aimed at making the Massiah doctrine
a more visible public issue."); id. (advising the Department to undercut Massiah by
referring to it as a "right not to be questioned" rather than as a "right to counsel");
id. at 706 ("The Department should intensify its efforts to correct th[e] anomalous
situation [that Massiah has produced].").
99.
Id. at 702-05.
100. E.g., id. at 697 (suggesting '[tlwo alternative arguments [that] might provide
the Court with an attractive middle ground between complete repudiation of Massiah
and continued adherence to its irrational view of the right to counsel"); id. at 698
(maintaining that attacks on the Massiah right are not likely to be "fruitful at
present," but that arguments that "the exclusionary rule should not be applied to
evidence obtained by means of a Massiah violation or, alternatively, that the evidence
should be suppressed only when the police have not acted in good faith [hold] greater
promise for more immediate success").
101. See, e.g., id. at 663 ("[Massiah's]result is that the search for truth.., is thwarted."); id. at 687 (arguing that dangers to defendants in Massiah situations arise
from "inability to keep quiet and [a defendant's] misplaced trust in a fellow
criminal"); id. at 693-94 (stating that Massiah's exclusionary rule yields" 'precious
little'" and "insubstantial" benefits for society while it "reward[s] defendants with
windfalls that are wildly disproportionate to the gravity of the constitutional
violation[]"); id. at 696 (Massiah is "irrational and detrimental to effective law
enforcement, as well as subversive of the truth-finding process."); id. at 705 (noting
that the "poor prospects" of overturning the Massiah doctrine are the result of a
"lack of public awareness of the irrational and damaging state of the law in this
area"); id. at 706 (arguing that Massiah is "an enigma" that "thwart[s] the search
for truth" and "amount[s] to [an] obstruction[] of justice"; the "situation" it has
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lack of balance that is not typical of legal scholarship-even
the "advocacy scholarship" bemoaned by Professor Grano. °2
In all these respects, the Report is much more a work of legal
advocacy than a work of legal scholarship." 3
On the other hand, the Report resembles traditional scholarship in significant ways. It recounts a history of the development of the right to counsel,0 4 summarizes the development
and state of Massiah doctrine, 0 5 and then presents several
thought-provoking criticisms of that doctrine. °6 In these respects, it possesses considerably greater analytical depth than
the vast majority of briefs. 0 7
The "arguments" proffered-rooted in history, the core purposes of the sixth
amendment, and public policy considerations -resemble those
found in conventional scholarship.
In addition, specific
proposals for legal reform are not at all foreign to legal scholarship.'
Although some legal scholarship may be aimed
purely at academics, much of it aspires, like the Report, to
have tangible and pragmatic impact on the development or
reform of the law by arming litigants or influencing courts or
legislatures. Finally, although scholars typically avoid the
sustained, intemperate rhetoric and extreme one-sidedness not

created is "anomalous").
102. See Grano, supra note 12, at 398 n.12. Professor Grano would apparently
disagree with my assessment of the Report. He describes the Series as 'a new,
energetic, and serious voice-one grounded in coherent and careful argument, not in
inflated rhetoric." Id. at 401.
103. But see id. at 411 n.76 (discussing the analytical and advocative aspects of the
Report).
104. See REPORT NO. 3, MASSIAH, supra note 7, at 672-76.
105. See id. at 677-84.
106. See id. at 684-96.
107. The greater depth is no surprise, for the Report is not merely a litigant's
advocacy on the limited issues raised by a concrete case. Rather, it is a comprehensive blueprint aimed at providing the foundation for opposition to the Massiah
doctrine in all future cases. Its ultimate aim is not merely victory in some Massiah
cases, but triumph over Massiah itself. In that respect, it is much more than the
typical brief.
108. See, e.g., Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a
Rationale, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 467-69 (1982) (proposing a draft

statutory definition of the heat of passion defense); White, A Proposalfor Reform of
the Plea BargainingProcess, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 439, 453-65 (1971) (suggesting
prosecutor's office procedures to eliminate problems generated by plea bargaining
practices); Comment, Lead Us Not Into (Unwarranted)Temptation: A Proposal to
Replace the Entrapment Defense With a Reasonable Suspicion Requirement, 133 U.

PA. L. REV. 1193, 1216-30 (1985) (authored by Maura F.J. Whelan) (proposing
warrant and reasonable suspicion requirements as predicates for law enforcement
encouragement of criminal activity).
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uncommon in legal advocacy,' 0 9 scholarly authors are not
immune to rhetorical excess and do not always give opposing
views fair credit. 11 0
In sum, the Massiah Report is a hybrid. It contains some
elements characteristic of legal scholarship and others
associated with legal advocacy. It provides valuable reflections upon the character of legal scholarship in the area of
criminal procedure."'
2. Lessons for legal scholarship - Arguably, traditional
legal scholarship should emphasize the attributes it shares
with the Report and seek to become more advocative in
character. A contest of "scholarly adversaries" could be the
12
best way to test ideas and ensure constructive law reform.

109. Legal scholarship that possessed such characteristics would risk its credibility
and might well be dismissed as a "brief."
110. Professor Grano accuses the "liberals" of such failings. See supra note 91 and
accompanying text. He is undoubtedly correct. Although I have made some effort in
the past to be temperate and balanced, my previous writings probably render me
vulnerable to such criticism.. Nevertheless, the members of Professor Grano's
"discrete and insular" conservative minority, Grano, supra note 12, at 398 n.12, lack
standing to cast the first stone, for they have been guilty of the very same failings.
See supra note 92 and accompanying text; see also infra note 113 and accompanying
text.
"Unconventional" scholars have also evinced proclivities for excessive rhetoric or
one-sidedness. See Schlegel, Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated,and Affectionate History of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 391, 408
(1984) (noting the Law and Society Association's "bitter denunciations" of critical
legal studies (CLS) scholars as "the 'new doctrinal barbarians' " and referring to
Professor Tushnet's "wonderfully, or awfully ... foul-tempered review of Lawrence
Friedman's History"); Schwartz, With Gun and CameraThrough Darkest CLS-Land,
36 STAN. L. REV. 413, 419-20 (1984) (observing that one extreme in CLS literature
includes "polemical essays notable for turgidity, invective, and irresponsibility"); id.
at 440 (charging that CLS scholarship is often "moralistic, censorious, and preachy,"
that it claims a "monopoly of virtue" and that it is characterized by "vanity and lack
of sophistication"); id at 446 (stating that CLS writing engages in "misrepresentation"
by "false attribution to ideological opponents of a ridiculous position that can then
serve as a straw man to be demolished"); id. at 455 (suggesting that CLS could be
exposed as a "fountain of confusion," is characterized not by "reason but. . . volcanic
sub-rational emotion," and offers "surrealistic pictures for our minds"); West, supra
note 96, at 757-59 (1988) (observing that the "tone of scholarly discussion has become
decidedly negative" and bemoaning "hostile gut reactions," "passionate political and
cultural evaluations," "mean-spirited academic putdown[s]," and "dismissive approach[es]"); id. at 759 (accusing another scholar not only of "fan[ning] and fuel[ing]
an immobilizing ideological polarization, but also [of] hid[ing] the basic issues at
stake," and urging an effort 'to present the most subtle and sympathetic interpretations of an opponent's viewpoints before we uncharitably 'trash' them").
111. The lessons for legal scholarship that follow might well apply outside the
criminal procedure area, but, for purposes of the present discussion, I have focused
upon the area I know best.
112. Professor Grano's language, see Grano, supra note 12, at 401 (observing that
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In my view, however, legal scholarship ought to eschew the
adversarial and advocative characteristics that pervade the
Massiah Report.1 13 In tone, form, and approach it should
emphasize its scholarly, not its legal, heritage. The objective
should not be to win, but to explore and explain issues fully.
Scholars should inquire
into and search for, but not battle
" 114
over, "truth and good.
More specifically, serious scholarship should shun misleading
rhetoric and one-sided discussion of significant legal questions." 5 Its language should not be inflammatory, intolerant, or
dismissive." 6 It should not employ words as tools to mischaracterize opponents' voices or obscure in ambiguity the
assumptions and weaknesses of preferred views. Nor should
its quest for the best legal order be characterized by accusation, unfair representation of others' views, the construction
and demolition of straw men, 1 7 or the deceptive repetition

the Department of Justice has "joined the fray"); id. (noting that the Series may bring
about a "more balanced and vigorous competition of ideas.., essential for the testing
of truth and good in a free society"), his approval of the advocacy scholarship of a
fellow "conservative," see id. at 408 (quoting the hyperbolic rhetoric of Professor
Uviller), and his own indulgence in one-sided rhetoric and accusation, see supra note
92, suggest that he may endorse the view that scholarship ought to be adversarial.
These aspects of his Introduction might, however, reflect a perceived need to answer
the advocacy scholarship of the left in kind. See Grano, supra note 12, at 402
(suggesting that the Warren Court was "sustained and emboldened by a plethora of
advocacy scholarship," that the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have regrettably been
without such support, and that the Truth in Criminal Justice Series might fill that
void). If given the choice, Professor Grano might well prefer a truce in which both
sides set aside the potentially destructive tools of the advocate's trade.
113. I cannot emphasize enough that these are my (potentially idle) reflections
inspired by the Series and Professor Grano's Introduction. I offer them as part of my
response to the Report and to prompt others to reflect upon the enterprise of legal
scholarship. I make no claim to the truth about scholarship, and hasten to concede
that mine is but one, quite conservative, view of the enterprise.
114. Grano, supra note 12, at 401; cf. 3 H. GEORGE, THE COMPLETE WORKS OF
HENRY GEORGE: THE LAND QUESTION 23 (1881) ("He who seeks the truth, let him
proclaim it, without asking who is for it or who is against it."); W. PENN, SOME
FRUITS OF SOLITUDE No. 142, at 36 (1900) (rev. ed. 1718) ("Truth often suffers more
by the Heat of its Defenders, than from the Arguments of its Opposers.").
115. Cf. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 589 (1980)
(Brennan, J., concurring) ("Analysis is not advanced by rhetorical statements....").
116. See, e.g., West, supra note 96, at 758-59 (disapproving of Ewald's critique of
Unger as a "mean-spirited academic putdown" and a "dismissive approach"). It would
appear that some scholars involved in and opposed to the critical legal studies
movement do not share my concerns or biases in these respects. See supra note 110.
117. E.g. Schwartz, supra note 110, at 446 (chastising critical legal studies
scholars who falsely attribute to their "ideological opponents.., a ridiculous position
that can then serve as a straw man to be demolished").
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Instead, the scholarly
of appealing emotional themes."'
enterprise should be rooted in honest, temperate, and logical
discourse." 9
Frank and fair discussion entails acknowledgment of the
vulnerabilities of preferred positions, a dose of self-doubt, and
the recognition of potential merits in opposing viewpoints. 20
In the scholarly realm, there is nothing wrong with colorful
language or the well-turned phrase that advances analysis.
There is a lot wrong, however, with the dishonest abuse of
words to achieve ulterior, political motives.' 2 ' If legal schol122
arship aspires to a place among other scholarly pursuits,
it ought to avoid the temptations of legal and political advocadevices often employed in the service of
cy and the rhetorical
123
advocacy.
such

118. The title of the Series itself-"Truth in Criminal Justice"-is one such
emotional theme. Other illustrations of such themes include: "probative, reliable,
and voluntary admissions of guilt," REPORT No. 3, MAsSIAH, supra note 7, at 663;
"the integrity of the truth-finding process," id. at 664; and "the low regard our
existing system has for truth, finality, and rationality," Grano, supra note 12, at 420.
The point is not that all such phrases are inappropriate-though some seem
excessive. Rather, the point is that scholarly discussion should not be rooted in or
dependent upon accusation, emotion, and the consistent repetition of unexplored,
superficially appealing phrases.
119. See West, supra note 96, at 757-59 (complaining about the "decidedly
negative" tone of"scholarly discussion," the "hostile gut reactions [that] have replaced
guarded, respectful responses," the "passionate political and cultural evaluations
[that] have supplanted balanced intellectual assessments," and urging "subtle and
sympathetic interpretations of an opponent's viewpoints").
120. Just as I am a supporter of "fair play in criminal justice," see Tomkovicz,
Defense of Massiah, supra note 9, at 47-51, I am a supporter of "fair play in legal
scholarship." In my view, fair play in both spheres promotes the best results.
121. On this point, I doubt that Professor Grano disagrees.
122. I suppose some might argue that legal scholarship should not aspire to such
a place, that it is so distinct that it need not adopt any of the conventions of other
scholarly endeavors. Obviously, I disagree. It should be made clear, however, that
I am not suggesting that legal scholarship must be like other scholarly pursuits in
all respects. My suggestions are strictly limited to those made in the text.
123. I only mean to suggest that traditional scholarship should avoid these
temptations, not that other strains of legal scholarship should necessarily eschew
them or that there is anything wrong with legal, political, or social advocacy. I
suppose that CLS adherents might well respond that the traditional scholarship I
describe and endorse, despite its outward appearance and declared neutrality, is
engaged in an unavoidably "political" campaign to legitimate and maintain the legal
and social status quo and its inherent inequities. See Schlegel, supra note 110,
at 406 ("[T]raditional legal scholarship [has been made to] appear more and
more bankrupt in its attempt to maintain the appearance of neutral disinterestedness . . . ."); id. at 411 (according to CLS "LAW IS POLITICS, pure and simple");
Schwartz, supra note 110, at 426 (stating that CLS believes liberalism and law mask
and legitimate capitalist exploitation and disarm the oppressed); id. at 433 ("CLS
writers see law as simply an expression of politics."); West, supra note 96, at 766
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I may be in error in thinking that "advocacy scholarship" is
an undesirable pursuit for scholars. Legal knowledge might
be best furthered by highly charged, strident, one-sided
"debates." I sense, however, that the quest for legal knowledge is more likely to be advanced by even-handed, rational
analyses, and that extreme advocacy scholarship tends to
deceive, obscure, and confuse.' 2 4
This discussion of the attributes of good scholarship and the
dangers of excessive advocacy is not intended as an indictment
of the Report or the entire Truth in Criminal Justice Series.
The DOJ intended its Reports to be partisan efforts designed
"to persuade," 2 ' to "allay apprehensions,"'2 6 and to win
the battle against foes that, in its view, unjustifiably handicap
criminal law enforcement. The Massiah Report is more like
"a brief than an objective inquiry" 12 7 or an impartial search
for legal knowledge because it was so designed. Nevertheless,
reflection upon the attributes of the Report can furnish
specific and valuable lessons about the perils of "advocacy
scholarship." 2 ' The discussion that follows will center on a
topic raised in my introduction,' 2 9 the DOJ's employment of
"truth" as a weapon against Massiah. That "campaign for
truth" highlights the dangers of rhetorical, imbalanced
scholarship.
3 °
3. The use, abuse, and one-sided pursuit of truth Early on, Report Number Three introduces its focal theme by

([CLS tries] to show the complex ways in which partiality and partisanship are at
work in the dispassionate styles and forms of liberal discourse.").
124. It might be suggested that such fears are groundless because readers are
undoubtedly smart enough not to be deceived or confused by "advocacy scholarship."
Although I would like to believe that such is the case, I doubt that the entire
audience of legal scholarship-other scholars, students, lawyers, judges, and
legislators-are immune to the perils of "advocacy in scholarship's clothing."
125. REPORT No. 3, MASSIAH, supra note 7, at 705.
126. Id.
127. Grano, supra note 12, at 411 n.76.
128. It does not seem unfair to target the Report as an example of what legal
scholarship should not be like. It has been published in a law journal. Moreover,
Professor Grano has praised the Series in terms that suggest that it is-or is the
equivalent of-a serious work of legal scholarship. See supra note 96. In addition,
although the advocative traits of the Report are more pervasive and obvious,
"advocacy scholarship" shares those traits. Put otherwise, "advocacy scholarship"
suffers from a less severe case of the very same symptoms.
129. See supra notes 1-14 and accompanying text.
130. For a discussion on the limits of truth, see M. DE MONTAIGNE, THE COMPLETE
ESSAYS OF MONTAIGNE, bk. III, ch. 13, at 826 (D. Frame trans. 1958) ("For truth itself
does not have the privilege to be employed at any time and in any way; its use, noble
as it is, has its circumscriptions and limits.").
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accusing Massiah of "thwart[ing]" the "search for truth."1 3 '
It proceeds by contending that Massiah "impair[s] . . . the
truth-finding process," 132 is "subversive of the search for
truth in criminal trials, " 133 "impedes the search for
truth,"' 3 4 "insulates the accused from the consequences of
voluntary statements whether or not [they] would
impair . . . the integrity of the truth-finding process," 35
is an "impediment to the search for truth,"13 "thwart[s] the
search for truth, '3 and "obstruct[s] . . . justice." 38 In the
course of its discussion, the Justice Department converts
Massiah into a "straw man," a virtually insubstantial "right
not to be questioned."' 39 Then, using "truth" as a bludgeon,
it destroys that defenseless right.
It is neither inappropriate nor unfair to suggest that truth
is a valued systemic objective1 4' and that Massiah can undermine its pursuit.'
In a scholarly work, however, it does
seem both inappropriate and unfair to use truth and a variety
of other words and phrases to exaggerate, obfuscate, and
appeal to emotions. At some point, the rhetoric of "truth in
criminal justice" impedes the scholarly pursuit of knowledge,
42
justice, and other truths.
The truth campaign in the MassiahReport also suffers from
serious imbalance in at least two important respects. First,
although not asserting that truth is the only value in our
constitutional system, it gives minimal recognition to other

131. REPORT No. 3, MASSIAH, supra note 7, at 663.
132. Id. at 665.
133. Id. at 666.
134. Id. at 671.
135. Id. at 683.
136. Id. at 690.
137. Id. at 706.
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., id. at 696, 706; see also id. at 705 (urging the Department not to
refer to Massiah as a "right to counsel," but to "speak[] instead of 'the Massiah
"right" not to be questioned' ").
140. But see Rifkind, supra note 10, at 545 ("[Olver the years . . .I have freed
myself of the necessity of uttering the litany that the object of trials is to ascertain
the truth and I have come to embrace the perhaps less exalted but more viable
proposition that the office of a trial is to resolve a controversy.")
141. If those suggestions are unfair and inappropriate, then I too have been guilty
of unfair and inappropriate suggestion. See Tomkovicz, Defense of Massiah, supra
note 9, at 43-48.
142. See, e.g., T. MIDDLETON, The Family of Love, act V, scene iii, line 2078 (S.
Shepherd ed. 1979) ("[T]ruth needs not the foil of rhetoric."); W. PENN, supra note
114, at 36 ("Truth often suffers more by the Heat of its Defenders, than from the
Arguments of its Opposers.").
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potentially legitimate sixth amendment values and neglects
entirely some of the arguable underpinnings of the Massiah
doctrine. 4 3 A scholarly study of Massiah would not have to
concede the validity of other values. Nor would it have to
agree that those values should take priority over truth. It
should, however, give those values a fair description and
acknowledgement. In fairness to readers and to the quest for
knowledge at the heart of the scholarly enterprise, complete
144
and balanced discussion would seem highly preferable.
Perhaps of greater importance is the DOJ's one-sided claim
that truth is its ally. Admittedly, the Justice Department does
have truth in criminal justice on its side of the Massiah
debate.' 45 However, there is another truth at stake in the

143. See infra notes 179-92 and accompanying text.
144. Although giving fair acknowledgement to the opposing side would strengthen
the scholarly undertaking, it could well undermine the advocate's goals. It is
understandable, therefore, that the DOJ has not done so.
145. It should not go unnoticed that the "truth in criminal justice" that is central
to the DOJ's case against Massiah is not the same truth in criminal justice that is
among the sixth amendment's core values. The DOJ contests Massiah because it
thwarts truth by impeding conviction of the guilty. Counsel's constitutional truthpromoting function, however, is to guard against conviction of the innocent. See
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 68-69 (1932)) ("[An accused] 'requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step
in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the
danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.' ").
Thus, although the DOJ's argument against Massiah is rooted in the pursuit of a
primary objective of the criminal justice system, the DOJ's goal is not to further the
same face of truth sought by the constitutional guarantee at issue.
It is arguable that in some cases Massiah counsel can promote truth by guarding
against unreliable evidence and inaccurate convictions. Much of the deliberate
elicitation regulated by Massiah doctrine is conducted by undercover government
informants whose characters and motivations are subject to question. It is entirely
possible for those informants to create risks of convicting the innocent by fabricating
or distorting inculpatory revelations. See Rohrlich, Informant-Aided Convictions
Going Unchallenged, L.A. Times, Oct. 20, 1989, at B1, col. 2; Use of Jailhouse
Informers Reviewed in Los Angeles, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1989, at A14, col. 1. The
Massiah right to counsel does diminish the risk that an accused could be convicted
on the basis of such informant-generated untruths. Either counsel is present when
his client reveals information and is later able to contradict the false report of an
informant, or counsel is not present and the Massiah exclusionary rule prevents the
admission of the fabricated or distorted statement.
I do not mean to suggest that dishonest informants pose a major threat to our
system's quest for accurate outcomes. I am not sure how extensive the danger is.
Nor do I mean to hold Massiah counsel up as a cure-all for the perils of false
informant reports. Because the current doctrine limits the circumstances in which
the defendant is entitled to counsel, see Tomkovicz, Defense of Massiah, supra note
9, at 15-22, Massiah provides only partial protection against the threats to truth
posed by ill-motivated or incompetent government informants. Instead, my point is
that in some circumstances the Massiah right can and does promote the search for
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debate-the "truth" about the meaning and scope of the sixth
amendment right to counsel. 146 The truth about the right to
counsel may be that it frequently serves values that impede
the search for truth in criminal justice. Alternatively, the
constitutional truth may be that counsel seldom or never seeks
interests that defeat truth. In either case, ascertaining the
constitutional truth is a "higher" goal than ensuring truth in
criminal justice. Despite different perspectives and conclusions, all involved in scholarly research concerning the
Massiah doctrine purport to be, and should be, engaged in a
search for that "higher" truth.141 Yet, the Massiah Report
fails to acknowledge the importance, much less the superiority, of that truth. 14 By relying so heavily upon and suggesting the superiority of truth in criminal justice, the Report is
deceptive. Moreover, it does not fairly represent its opponents'
positions. Thoughtful legal scholarship would recognize that
no one has sole possession of the truth and that many can
legitimately claim its pursuit.
In the following discussion of the substantive debate over
Massiah, I plan to take the preceding lessons seriously. I hope
to avoid rhetoric that fails to advance the analysis and to
recognize that my preferred constitutional interpretation is
not necessarily the truth. 14' The main objective will be to
present the basic arguments in defense of Massiah fairly and
rationally so that those concerned with the truth about the

truth. Consequently, even truth in criminal justice does not belong entirely to one
side of the Massiah debate.
In any event, for purposes of the present discussion I am willing to concede that
the DOJ is correct in contending that Massiah counsel is more likely to impede than
to promote the search for truth.
146. I have previously referred to this more generally as "truth in constitutional
law." See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
147. The government's obligation to pursue constitutional truth is probably more
compelling than the mere scholar's obligation. The sovereign is duty-bound to
preserve and protect the Constitution's guarantees. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7
(prescribing that the President "shall take the following Oath or Affirmation: 'I do
solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will ... preserve, protect and defend the Constitution
of the United States' "); see also Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 513
n. 12 (1964) (noting the Assistant Attorney General's observation "that it is the duty
of the Attorney General to protect the rights of individuals guaranteed by the
Constitution").
148. It could be that the truth about the sixth amendment is that it rarely seeks
objectives that defeat truth in criminal justice. In that case, "truth in constitutional
law" and "truth in criminal justice" would be highly compatible goals. Still, the
constitutional truth would be "higher" or superior in the sense that it, not truth in
criminal justice, must be the guiding light of the Massiah scholar.
149. I cannot promise that I will succeed completely. Old habits die hard.
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constitutional right to counsel can make informed choices.

B. The Substantive Debate Over Massiah

The objects here are to strip away the rhetoric and accusations that have characterized and obscured discussions of
Massiah and to isolate the substance that ought to be the
focus of debate.
1. Points of agreement - In order to identify the basic
choices and disagreements that have led me to different
conclusions regarding Massiah than those reached by the
DOJ, 150 it might be helpful to describe first our significant
points of agreement. First, I concur that promoting the
"truth-seeking" goal of the criminal justice system is one vital
rationale for the sixth amendment right to counsel. Counsel
protects the accused against perils that risk convicting the
innocent.1 5 Second, I agree that another reason for granting the assistance of counsel is to ensure "fairness" or "fair
treatment" for the criminally accused.'5 2
Moreover, the
fairness goal is neither synonymous nor coextensive with the
truth-seeking rationale.'5 3
Third, the Massiah grant of
counsel impedes the search for truth. When exercised by a

150. It bears repeating that the DOJ is far from alone in its criticism of the
Massiah doctrine as constitutionally indefensible. See Grano, supra note 12, at 410
n.70; Uviller, Evidence From the Mind of the CriminalSuspect: A Reconsiderationof
the Current Rules of Access and Restraint, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1137, 1138, 1162
(1987); see also Tomkovicz, Defense of Massiah, supra note 9, at 25-30 (discussing the
judicial and scholarly arguments against Massiah).
151. See REPORT No. 3, MASSIAH, supra note 7, at 664, 683; Tomkovicz, Defense of
Massiah, supra note 9, at 44. It bears repeating that counsel's primary role in
protecting the integrity of the truth-seeking process lies in preventing conviction of
the innocent. Although defense counsel has an obligation not to proffer false
exculpatory testimony, see Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 166-67 (1986), counsel does
not have a duty to ensure that inculpatory evidence is presented at trial or to
promote the conviction of a guilty client. Indeed, a defense attorney who sought to
do so would seem to be chargeable with ineffective assistance. See, e.g., Tomkovicz,
Defense of Massiah, supra note 9, at 52 n.224.
152. See REPORT NO. 3, MASSIAH, supra note 7, at 664, 687; Tomkovicz, Defense of
Massiah, supra note 9, at 47-49.
153. The DOJ appears to agree that they are not synonymous or coextensive. See
REPORT NO. 3, MASSIAH, supra note 7, at 664 ("[Tlhe core purpose of the sixth
amendment [is] ensuring the fairness of trials and the integrity of the truth-finding
process."); id. at 697 (arguing that the Massiah right is not justifiable because the
presence of counsel in Massiah contexts "affects neither the fairness of the process
...
nor the reliability of the evidence").
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defendant it tends to prevent the accused from revealing
probative, reliable, inculpatory evidence that would assist the
government in convicting the factually guilty. 4 When it is
violated and its exclusionary rule operates, such evidence is
suppressed.'5 5 As a result, Massiah is costly in the ways
described by the DOJ; it reduces the number of convictions
and allows some offenders to remain free to commit further
crimes. 5 6
Fourth, Massiah situations typically involve
neither actual nor potential coercion. Consequently, Massiah
is not necessary to prevent governmental coercion, coerced
15 7
confessions, or the use of coerced confessions to convict.
Finally, perhaps the most significant point of agreement is
that Massiah's legitimacy should depend upon whether it
provides important protection for
the values that the sixth
58
amendment is meant to shelter.
This last point raises the issue upon which rational Massiah

154. See REPORT No. 3, MASSIAH, supra note 7, at 689; Tomkovicz, Defense of
Massiah, supra note 9, at 46-48.
155. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 (1985) (rejecting the claim that
statements pertinent to the charged crime should not be suppressed because
government agents were conducting good faith investigation of a separate, uncharged
offense); see also REPORT No. 3, MASSIAH, supra note 7, at 693.
156. The magnitude of Massiah's costs, however, is unknown. I would not agree
with the suggestion that it results in large numbers of lost convictions or frees
numerous dangerous criminals to prey upon society. See Tomkovicz, Defense of
Massiah, supra note 9, at 61 n.247 (explaining why "actual costs of lost convictions
due to the Massiah right would not seem to be very substantial").
157. See REPORT No. 3, MASSIAH, supra note 7, at 686-87; Tomkovicz, Defense of
Massiah, supra note 9, at 39 n.182. Moreover, there is little need for sixth
amendment counsel in situations involving actual or threatened compulsion or
coercion. The Miranda doctrine, based on the explicit privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination, and the "coerced confession" doctrine, based on the due process
clauses, combat those constitutional evils. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
478-79 (1966) (prescribing procedures to dispel the inherent compulsion in custodial
interrogation settings); see also Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959)
(concluding that the use of an involuntary confession is inconsistent with due process
and discussing the reasons for that conclusion).
158. REPORT No. 3, MASSLAH, supra note 7, at 665 (criticizing Massiah's regulation
of surreptitious questioning because such law enforcement activity "does not expose
the defendant to any danger against which the sixth amendment was intended to
protect"); id. at 685 (arguing that the Court has extended the right to counsel when
there is a "need ... to protect the values that the sixth amendment is designed to
safeguard," and that Massiah counsel is unwarranted because surreptitious
investigation does not implicate "the core purposes of the sixth amendment"); id. at
696 ('[A] successful attack on Massiah would not impair the value of the right to
counsel [in situations in which counsel] serves the purposes of the sixth amendment."); Tomkovicz, Defense of Massiah, supra note 9, at 46-60 (defending Massiah
on the basis of sixth amendment values protected by counsel in surreptitious
surveillance contexts).
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debate ultimately must focus: Does the Massiah right safeguard values at the core of the sixth amendment right to the
assistance of counsel? Answering that question requires
identification of those sixth amendment values and of the roles
and functions of counsel in safeguarding them.'5 9
2. The search for core sixth amendment values - Theoretically, the task is not to decide what values we want counsel to
serve today. Few would suggest that the Constitution is ours
to modify-except through the amending process.160 Nor is
the task to determine precisely what counsel did at the time
of the sixth amendment's adoption and to ensure that counsel
does no more and no less today. Few, if any, believe that the
Constitution was meant to be a specific code of conduct, rather
than a charter of enduring values.'' Instead, our objects
should be to discern what values and ends the framers sought
and to ensure that they are protected against
all threats,
162
including novel perils of the modern age.

159. See Grano, supra note 12, at 396 n.5 ("It is appropriate in constitutional
interpretation to ask what ends or purposes the framers and ratifiers were trying to
achieve."); see also Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy's Sake: Toward an
Expanded Vision of the Fourth Amendment PrivacyProvince, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 645,
650 n.28 (1985) ("Maintaining the vitality of principles worthy ofconstitutionalization
demands an approach based ultimately upon the animating spirits of such
guarantees.").
160. Professor Grano criticizes "the philosophy, reflected in much of what passes
as constitutional law today, that permits courts to add to the Constitution values and
principles never ratified by the people." Grano, supra note 12, at 397 n.5. Although
I agree with Professor Grano, I would add that his criticism is equally applicable to
those along the entire political spectrum-particularly to those at each extreme.
Neither liberals bent upon the expansion of rights, nor conservatives committed to
the expansion of law enforcement authority, are entitled to modify the Constitution's
commands. I make this observation because both Professor Grano and the Justice
Department place some reliance upon the tenor of public opinion. Id. at 424 (noting
that "the public [thinks] that the American criminal justice system has gone seriously
and fundamentally awry"); REPORT No. 3, MASsIAH, supra note 7, at 668 (recommending as part of the "educational strategy" a " 'consciousness raising' campaign aimed
at making the Massiah doctrine a more visible public issue"). The views of the
majority are at least as threatening to the integrity and stability of constitutional
guarantees as the preferences of the civil liberties advocates feared by Professor
Grano. See Tomkovicz, supra note 159, at 689 n.178 (recognizing that the Bill of
Rights was intended to protect minorities' rights against majority oppression).
161. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 186 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("[T]he Bill of Rights was ... designed, not to prescribe with 'precision' permissible
and impermissible activities, but to identify . . . fundamental human libert[ies].").
162. Times change and new threats to constitutional values arise. If the values
are to endure, the legal devices used to shield those values must evolve. See Payton
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 591 n.33 (1980) (observing that search and seizure rules
"have evolved through the process of interpreting the Fourth Amendment in light of
contemporary norms and conditions" and that the "Court has not simply frozen into
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If history spoke clearly and explicitly about the framers'
purposes in adopting a constitutional counsel guarantee, there
would be little room for debate. However, as the DOJ admits,
the historical record regarding the framers' intent is exceedingly sparse."' Consequently, no one can be doubt-free concerning the original reasons for constitutionalizing a right to
counsel.
We must draw inferences about the core sixth
amendment values from the specific historical functions of
counsel and the basic philosophy of the framers-particularly
in matters of criminal procedure. To some extent, the task
can also be guided by the assumptions and choices reflected in
past precedents concerning the right to counsel.
In my view, constitutional interpretation should not be
informed equally by history, logic, and public policy."
Rather, the values and purposes underlying the right to
counsel-what the DOJ refers to as "logic"-should be the
primary source of our guidance.'6 5 History and public policy
are but aids to understanding the logic of the sixth amendment guarantee.
Naked history cannot dictate precise
answers, but historical practices can provide insights into, and
reflections upon, the framers' understanding and objectives.
Public policies deemed desirable today cannot supplant
policies constitutionalized by the framers. Policy implications,
however, are a guide to the values at stake in given situations,

constitutional law those law enforcement practices that existed at the time of the
Fourth Amendment's passage"); Grano, supra note 12, at 397 n.5 (quoting Ollman v.
Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 995-96 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring)) ("[I]t is the task
of the judge in this generation to discern how the framers' values, defined in the
context of the world they knew, apply to the world we know....
The evolution of
doctrine to accomplish that end [i.e., making the framers' values effective] contravenes no postulate of judicial restraint.").
163. See REPORT No. 3, MASSIAH, supra note 7, at 673; Tomkovicz, Defense of
Massiah, supra note 9, at 10-11.
164. The Report might be read to imply that history, logic, and public policy are
equally important tools of constitutional interpretation. The Report gives them
coequal status in its discussion without indicating that any one is a superior guide.
165. It seems that Professor Grano might share this fundamental interpretive
premise. See Grano, supra note 12, at 396 n.5 (rejecting the DOJ's rigid historical
criticism of landmark right-to-counsel decisions and suggesting that the "ends or
purposes [of] the framers" are appropriate guides to constitutional interpretation).
It is possible that the DOJ would endorse my view that "logic" is predominant. After
all, the Report does acknowledge that counsel is called for if the dangers against
which the sixth amendment was meant to protect are present. See REPORT No. 3,
MASSIAH, supra note 7, at 685. It is entirely possible, though not certain, that the
DOJ's historical and policy-based arguments are merely support for conclusions that
are primarily based in constitutional logic.
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and can aid the detection of threats to constitutional values. 166
My analysis of the sixth amendment's "logic" leads me to
different conclusions regarding Massiah primarily because of
a different understanding of the entitlement to "fairness"
implicit in the grant of counsel.' 67 I find a more expansive
entitlement to "adversarial fair play""6 ' embodied in the
right to counsel, an entitlement that can conflict with and
outweigh society's interest in "truthful" conviction of the
guilty. 69 As a result, my conclusions that the Massiah right
to counsel is defensible 7 ° and that the Massiah exclusionary
rule is constitutionally required 7 ' are antithetical to those
in the Report.
According to the Justice Department, the overarching goal
of the constitutional right to counsel is to promote the "fairness of trials."'72 Counsel ensures "fairness" by (1) "equaliz166. For example, the kinds of law enforcement activity hampered by Massiah
counsel and the number of potential lost convictions help us to pinpoint the balance
of values struck by recognition of the Massiah right. Conversely, the consequences
for counsel's defense of an accused at trial are indicators of the values that would be
sacrificed by abolishing the Massiahright. See Tomkovicz, Defense ofMassiah, supra
note 9, at 56-59 (discussing the impact on trial counsel's efficacy if assistance was
denied in Massiah contexts).
167. Both the DOJ and I recognize that "fairness"-a typically ill-defined, nebulous
value-is a sixth amendment objective. A close examination of the DOJ's analysis
reveals, however, that its conception of fairness is much less generous than mine. See
infra notes 172-174 and accompanying text.
168. See Tomkovicz, Defense of Massiah, supra note 9, at 47-51.
169. Professor Grano suggests that truth must be the primary objective of our
system, and that constitutional interpretation, in recognition of that primacy, should
sacrifice the pursuit of truth only when "compelling" ends or "other goals of
overriding importance" justify that sacrifice. See Grano, supra note 12, at 403. He
also suggests the need for "an evaluation of the importance of truth discovery relative
to other goals the system might have." Id. at 402. I assume that Professor Grano
does not mean to suggest that contemporary interpreters are wholly free to decide
what values are sufficiently compelling and how important the pursuit of truth
should be in our system. If that were the case, some "unpopular" constitutional
guarantees (such as the fourth amendment) might be effectively abrogated. Difficult
issues and close cases necessarily afford some room for the influence of modern
preferences and judgments. Nonetheless, it is not our task to substitute present
preferences for the constitutional balances struck by the framers. To the extent that
we can, we should try to ascertain and implement their choices. See, e.g., Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 559-60 (1978) (suggesting that the Court does not have
the power to require more than probable cause and a warrant to search because to
do so would ignore the balance struck by the framers).
170. I have explained that conclusion at length previously. See generally
Tomkovicz, Defense of Massiah, supra note 9.
171. I have also explained this conclusion at length in an earlier article. See
generally Tomkovicz, Massiah Exclusion, supra note 9.
172. REPORT No. 3, MASSIAH, supra note 7, at 685; see also id. at 664 (recognizing
that sixth amendment "core purpose" is "ensuring the fairness of trials and the
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ing the strength of the adversaries," and (2) "protecting the
integrity of the truth-finding process." 7 3 Counsel's specific
"role ... in achieving those goals is to prepare the accused's
defense and to act as his advocate in encounters with the
government at which the case is advanced toward disposition
or at which the reliability of the truth-finding process might
be unfairly undermined." 7 4 There is little reason to disagree with those premises.
The DOJ believes that counsel is not warranted in Massiah
situations because those situations implicate neither the core
purposes of the sixth amendment nor the roles of counsel in
effectuating those purposes. In Massiah contexts, a defendant is "not confronted with complex legal procedures or by
an expert adversary."'7 5
As a result, "the absence of
counsel... will [not] result in unfairness to the defendant at
trial, either by rendering him less able to deal with the
intricacies of the law and the advocacy of an expert opponent,
or by subjecting him to the risk of conviction on the basis of
unreliable evidence."' 7 6 The premise of these views is that
the sixth amendment "right to fair treatment at trial" is
comprised of but two guarantees: (1) an assurance against
potentially inaccurate convictions based on unreliable evidence, and (2) an assurance against conviction due to "legal
incompetence." 7 7 Because those are the sole components of

integrity of the truth-finding process"); id. at 683 (criticizing Massiah's insulation of
the accused in situations that neither "impair the fairness of the trial [nior the
integrity of the truth-finding process").
In much constitutional discourse the word "fairness" is bandied about as if it had
one commonly accepted, indisputable, and specific meaning. In teaching constitutional rights and the opinions of the Supreme Court construing those rights, I usually
alert students to the fact that fairness has multiple faces. I urge students to attempt
to discern how different authors use the term in different contexts to mean quite
different things. When unexplained, "fairness" is just another rhetorical weapon used
to obscure and gain argumentative advantage. See, e.g., id. at 687 ("This is simply
not 'unfairness' of the kind with which the sixth amendment right to counsel is
concerned.").
173. Id. at 685.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 685-86. Moreover, according to the DOJ, there is no interference with
the right to consult with counsel or the right to prepare a defense. Id. at 686. By
this, the Justice Department means that informants in Massiah settings neither spy
on nor impede an accused's discussions with counsel, nor do they hinder the defense's
efforts to construct an "affirmative" case against the government's charges. Of
course, by eliciting incrimination from the mind of the accused, those informants do
diminish the likelihood that efforts to construct a successful defense will succeed.
176. Id. at 686.
177. I use the phrase "legal incompetence" as a shorthand description of a
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the fairness sought by the sixth amendment, counsel is only
required to combat unreliability or to provide equalizing
"legal" expertise or advocacy.'7 8
The Justice Department's limiting constitutional premises
are neither self-evident nor indisputable. 179 A competing
view that supports Massiah holds that the sixth amendment
includes a more substantial entitlement to "adversarial fair
play." 8 ° According to this view, counsel is supposed to
"equalize" the accused in all respects in the contest with the
state.' 8 ' If a situation calls for strictly "legal" knowledge or
expert advocacy against a trained foe, then counsel should
assist a defendant in those respects. However, if the state
attempts to prevail by confronting an accused in ways that
demand other defensive resources, then counsel ought to
provide the type of assistance called for by the situation. The
pro-Massiah view agrees that it is unfair to require a defendant to fend for himself when confronted with legal questions
or the advocacy of a legally trained opponent. That view also
finds it unfair to require a defendant to stand alone in any

defendant's inability to cope with technical legal procedures, substantive legal
questions, or expert legal advocacy.
178. In fairness to the DOJ, the Report also suggests that the right to fair
treatment includes an assurance against conviction based on evidence yielded by
government compulsion. See REPORT No. 3, MASSIAH, supra note 7, at 686. Of
course, to some extent this facet of fairness overlaps with the concern for unreliable
evidence. More important, the concession that sixth amendment fairness includes
shelter against governmental compulsion amounts to little more than a recognition
of superfluous or redundant constitutional protection. The due process and selfincrimination clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments already provide dual
protections against coercion and compulsion. See supra note 157.
179. The Justice Department, Professor Grano, and I all make declarations
regarding our conceptions of the sixth amendment's "core purposes." None of our
conceptions can claim uncontestable historical support. Each is based on inferences
and some amount of conjecture. Those interested in the study of the Massiah right
should approach the subject with a healthy dose of skepticism, and should demand
an explanation of the inferential process that supports any particular conception of
core constitutional purposes and values. Nothing so critical to construction of the
sixth amendment should be able to rest on mere say-so.
180. See Tomkovicz, Defense of Massiah, supra note 9, at 46-51; see also Loewy,
Police-ObtainedEvidence and the Constitution: Distinguishing Unconstitutionally
ObtainedEvidence From Unconstitutionally Used Evidence, 87 MICH. L. REV. 907,928
(1989) (arguing that the right to counsel protects "the integrity of the adversarial
process").
181. See Perry v. Leeke, 109 S. Ct. 594, 609 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(quoting United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309 (1973)) ("By ensuring a defendant's
right to have counsel, which includes the concomitant right to communicate with
counsel at every critical stage of the proceedings . . . the Constitution seeks 'to
minimize the imbalance in the adversary system.' ").
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other confrontation with the state adversary that could
undermine his defense or promote the government's case. At
a minimum, the adversary system fair play envisioned by the
sixth amendment requires that an accused have the support,
wisdom, and advice of counsel in all personal encounters with
the state opponent that have potentially significant consequences for the defense of his case. The DOJ's inappropriately
narrow vision of counsel as a strictly "legal" expert and
advocate grows out of a constrictive understanding of "fair
treatment" in an adversarial scheme of conflict resolution.
When a government operative endeavors to elicit statements,
a defendant is effectively confronted by his adversary with a
very significant decision-whether to provide the adversary
with his probative, inculpatory knowledge. In making that
decision, the advice of counsel committed to the accused's best
interests is arguably critical. If the state deprives a defendant
of that advice either by concealing the fact that the adversary
is present and that a critical decision is involved or by openly
confronting a defendant and not permitting him to have counsel,8 2 it arguably denies an integral and vital
part of the
18 3
equalization essential to adversarial fair play.
The DOJ's view of the sixth amendment recognizes that it is
unfair to risk conviction of the innocent upon unreliable
evidence.
It also acknowledges that it is unfair to risk
conviction of an accused because, as a layperson, she was
unequipped to deal with "legal" matters or "expert" advocacy.' 8 4 A more expansive understanding of the sixth amend-

182. Massiah doctrine extends the right to counsel's assistance to defendants faced
with surreptitious elicitation by undercover government agents, see Maine v.
Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980), and to
those faced with unconcealed elicitation by known government agents, see Michigan
v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
183. See Michigan v. Harvey, 110 S. Ct. 1176, 1186 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("After the right to counsel has been implemented, the State may not shortcircuit the
adversarial system by confronting the defendant behind counsel's back.").
184. The Justice Department seems to acknowledge the unfairness of convictions
based on a lack of legal expertise even though the lack of expertise poses no threat
to accuracy and truth seeking. See REPORT No. 3 MASSIAH, supra note 7, at 686
(positing that the absence of counsel in Massiah contexts will not result in unfairness
to defendant "eitherby rendering him less able to deal with the intricacies of the law
and the advocacy of an expert opponent, or by subjecting him to the risk of conviction
on the basis of unreliable evidence") (emphasis added). I am not certain, however,
that the DOJ's concern with "unfairness" due to an accused's legal deficiencies is
wholly independent of its primary devotion to truth seeking. It is possible that the
recognition of an entitlement to "equal legal competence" is based on an assumption
that the quest for truth is likely to be undermined when a layperson is required to
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ment posits that "imbalanced" contests are inherently unfair-that convictions based on the products of any dealings
between the committed government adversary and an unequalized accused are inconsistent with accusatorial, adversarial principles." 5 According to that sixth amendment
understanding, the framers intended to promote
respect for individual worth, dignity, independence, and
autonomy by according defendants opportunities to
construct defenses and to protect themselves against state
power and authority. [The right to counsel enables us to]
derive satisfaction, strength and self-respect from staunch
refusal to take advantage of a lesser opponent and from
the willingness to grant to all the chance to contest
charges and to defend against accusation. Equalization of
the accused represents, and gives content to, several of our
societal commitments. Counsel ensures that the state will
carry the burden in a balanced fight played according to
neutral rules. Counsel imposes limits on the government's
power over citizens. Counsel gives content to the belief
that all deserve treatment as worthwhile members of
society and that no individual should be exploited." 6
Those core values would be undermined if the government
adversary could elicit incriminating information without
affording the accused an opportunity to consult with counsel.
Consequently, Massiah counsel is necessary to safeguard the

deal with legal complexities or the advocacy of the legal expert. If so, then the
Justice Department's conception of fairness is virtually entirely linked to the pursuit
of truth. By "fair treatment" the DOJ simply means treatment that limits the risk
that the factually innocent will be convicted.
185. Of course, neither view finds an imbalanced confrontation to be unfair if the
accused has waived the right to equalization.
186. Tomkovicz, Defense of Massiah, supra note 9, at 49-50 (footnotes omitted).
Our allowance of "unequal contests" if the accused waives the protection of counsel
does not undermine these values. As long as we ensure that defendants make
informed and willing choices to forego counsel, our commitments to respect
individuals, not to take advantage of inferiors, to abide by neutral rules, and to
conduct balanced contests are not compromised. In fact, not to allow a defendant to
relinquish counsel and represent himself would threaten certain of those sixth
amendment values. Arguably, to force counsel upon an unwilling accused and to
deny him the opportunity to defend himself shows disrespect for his worth, dignity,
and autonomy, and runs contrary to notions of limited governmental power over the
individual. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-21 (1975) (holding that an
accused has a sixth amendment right to self-representation, in part because of the
importance of respect for free choice and individual autonomy).
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187
core values of the sixth amendment.
This constitutional rationalization of Massiah counsel
suggests that Massiah-basedexclusion is not, as the DOJ in-

sists,

18

a judicially developed deterrent device. Rather, it

is an inseparable part of the sixth amendment right.'89
Massiah counsel's function is to advise an accused when the
government seeks disclosures for use at trial. For a defendant, the benefits of counsel consist of advice about whether
to talk and the resultant protection against disclosures that
would be used to convict him. An accused suffers complete
deprivation of the tangible benefits afforded by Massiah only
when the government uses statements elicited without
counsel's advice to diminish the opportunity for acquittal.
Consequently, exclusion of the products of a Massiah violation
is constitutionally necessary to prevent the government from
fully accomplishing the sixth amendment wrong. 9 ° The

187. One might wonder whether the sixth amendment would be satisfied if a
government informant, without otherwise intruding on consultations between
attorney and client, deliberately elicited information from an accused in the presence
of counsel. It is arguable that counsel should be wise and experienced (and wary)
enough to decide whether the accused should talk to an individual who could be
working for the government. If counsel, the equalizer, does not advise the client
against talking, any disclosures made are not the result of the state's failure to
respect the constitutional mandate of equalization. Rather, they are the product of
a counseled choice.
My understanding of the constitutional values and the significance of adversarial
fair play leads me to reject that argument and to conclude that the sixth amendment
would be offended by surreptitious elicitation in the presence of counsel. The
balanced contest inherent in the notion of adversarial fair play requires not just that
counsel be present, but that she be apprised of the facts relevant to the wisdom and
implications of the accused's decision to divulge information. A critical fact is the
presence of the adversary. Deceptive silence by the state that diminishes the quality
of the advice afforded by counsel tends to dishonor the values that underlie the sixth
amendment right to such advice.
In any case, the answer to this hypothetical question is unlikely to have much
practical impact. Governmental efforts to elicit in the presence of counsel are highly
improbable. Moreover, an attorney who failed to guard against efforts to elicit
information from his client might well be chargeable with ineffective assistance-a
deprivation of the benefits of the sixth amendment.
188. See supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text.
189. See Loewy, supra note 180, at 908, 931 (suggesting that exclusion is part of
the sixth amendment "procedural right"); Tomkovicz, Massiah Exclusion, supra note
9, at 771-72 ("Exclusion under Massiah is a personal right, neither more nor less
than an essential element of the constitutional entitlement to counsel."); see also
Grano, supra note 12, at 410-11 (suggesting that it is difficult to accept the DOJ's
view that the sixth amendment violation is fully accomplished without use of the
elicited disclosures at trial).
190. Indeed, without the use there would seem to be no constitutional wrong. See
Loewy, supra note 180, at 929-31 (noting that, contrary to its language in Maine v.
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admission of Massiah-violative evidence is not simply objectionable because it encourages the government to deprive
other defendants of counsel's assistance.' 9 '
Rather, the
admission of such evidence is forbidden because it would
constitute the culmination of the sixth amendment violation.
The exclusion of such evidence is essential to preserve for the
192
defendant the substantive benefits of adversarial fair play.
In sum, there are plausible sixth amendment value choices
furthered by a recognition of the right to counsel's assistance

Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985), the Court would likely hold that deliberate elicitation
alone does not violate the sixth amendment and that use of the evidence elicited is
required); Tomkovicz, Massiah Exclusion, supra note 9, at 769-72.
191. See Loewy, supra note 180, at 932 (arguing that in Massiah contexts, the
concept of deterrence of unconstitutional conduct is meaningless because there is no
unconstitutionality until the evidence is used at trial); Tomkovicz, Massiah Exclusion,
supra note 9, at 770-71 (entertaining the possibility that Massiah exclusion is both
a right and a deterrent sanction, but rejecting the deterrent rationale because there
is no "constitutionally injurious out-of-court conduct" to be deterred).
192. See Loewy, supra note 180, at 931 ("The justification for disallowing
[deliberately elicited] evidence [is] not . . . the 'exclusionary rule,' but the sixth
amendment's rules governing fair trials."). For a fuller exploration of the thoughts
sketched in the text, see Tomkovicz, Massiah Exclusion, supra note 9, at 753-73.
The Supreme Court recently decided a case that had presented the opportunity to
explain whether Massiah exclusion is part and parcel of the constitutional right to
counsel. The Court, however, forewent the opportunity and limited its reasoning to
the special nature of the Massiah violation in the case before it. In Michigan v.
Harvey, 110 S. Ct. 1176 (1990), a bare majority held that statements obtained in
violation of the sixth-amendment-based rule of Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625
(1986), are admissible to impeach a defendant's testimony. In the majority's view,
because the Jackson rule is a mere "prophylactic" safeguard against involuntary
waivers of counsel, a violation of the Jackson rule does not constitute a deprivation
of any sixth amendment entitlement. Harvey, 110 S. Ct. at 1177-82. The majority's
conclusion that the exclusionary consequences of a Jackson violation should be
confined to the prosecution's case-in-chief, like the exclusionary consequences of
analogous violations of Miranda's prophylactic rules, was based wholly on the
"prophylactic" character of the Jackson rule. Id. at 1180-81.
As a result of its focus upon the special character of the Jackson rule, the majority
revealed nothing about the breadth of the exclusion that follows from violations of
Massiah requirements that are integral parts of the core sixth amendment
entitlement. More significantly, the majority did not discuss whether exclusion based
on the latter kind of Massiah violation is itself a right, as I have suggested. Four
dissenting Justices did conclude that Massiah-based exclusion, including the
exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the Jackson rule, is part of the right to
counsel:
The exclusion of statements made by a represented and indicted defendant
outside the presence of counsel follows not as a remedy for a violation that has
preceded trial but as a necessary incident of the constitutionalright itself ....
It is thus the use of the evidence for trial, not the method of its collection prior
to trial, that is the gravamen of the Sixth Amendment claim.
Harvey, 110 S. Ct. at 1187 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (emphasis
added).
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in Massiah situations. Moreover, if the right to assistance is
constitutionally legitimate, an entitlement to the exclusion of
evidence obtained by denying that assistance is an essential
part of the sixth amendment right.
3. Challenges to and reasons to prefer the fairplay rationalization of Massiah - Beneath its obscuring rhetoric, the
Report does contain the primary challenge to the rationalization of Massiah proffered above. According to that challenge, even if respect for individual worth and dignity and an
unwillingness to take advantage of an unequal accused are
sixth amendment values, if properly defined those values are
not expansive enough to support a Massiah right to counsel.
Understood more narrowly, those fair play values are imperiled only when the government threatens to exploit an
accused's lack of legal knowledge or skill.
Massiah's critics might plausibly maintain that a defendant
needs a lawyer to compensate for his inferiority vis-a-vis the
state adversary only when faced with legal complexities or
expert advocacy. In other situations, where the questions
confronting an accused are not technical legal questions or the
opponent is not a skilled legal advocate, a defendant is not
inferior and a lawyer can make none of the special contributions that she is trained to make. An accused is adequately
equipped to deal with the questions and decisions involved in
those situations, and ought to be able to rely upon his own
resources, knowledge, skills, and talent. Put otherwise, a
defendant ought to be smart enough to cope with the confronting adversary who poses no legal questions and employs no
advocacy skills; he is entitled to the equalizing legal talents of
a lawyer, not the supplementing wisdom of "a guru."19 3
Therefore, the government dishonors the sixth amendment's
pledge of fair play only when it confuses an unaided defendant
with legal complexities or overpowers an unassisted defendant
with expert legal advocacy.
More specifically, critics contend that Massiah contexts do
not imperil sixth amendment values because deliberate
elicitation by an undercover informant 194 does not threaten

193. See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 295-96 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) ("[Tihere is no constitutional or historical support for concluding that an
accused has a right to have his attorney serve as a sort of guru who must be present
whenever an accused has an inclination to reveal incriminating information to
anyone who acts to elicit such information at the behest of the prosecution.").
194. While much of the debate over Massiah focuses on the most frequent type of
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to exploit any of the accused's cognizable "legal" vulnerabilities.'9 5 The government may be confronting an accused
with a choice to disclose or withhold knowledge concerning her
guilt, but that decision does not call for the special abilities of
a lawyer. A competent accused is able to decide whether it is
wise to talk to a known government agent or to disclose
inculpatory evidence to any other individual who could
presently be working for or might later decide to report
information to the government. 19 There is no reason to presume that the state is exploiting some inequality in those
situations. As a result, a system that allows and even
requires a defendant to deal with her adversary in those
settings without assistance cannot legitimately be accused of
disrespect for the individual, of exploitation of an inferior, or
of conducting an imbalanced contest that deprives its opponent
of a fighting chance.
According to Massiah opponents, when an accused needs
equalization to be a worthy adversary, the sixth amendment
grants it. When an accused does not need such equalization,
a grant of counsel would bestow more protection than fair play
values demand. The compelling reason not to accord a
defendant such "surplus" constitutional protection is that it
impedes the search for truth-that is, the legitimate and

elicitor-the undercover informant-it must be remembered that the right to counsel
recognized by Massiah doctrine also applies when the elicitor is a known police
officer. See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). The reasoning in the
text-and throughout my discussion of the Massiah right-applies not only to
undercover agents, but to known police officers. According to the anti-Massiah
argument, if officers do no more than elicit disclosures from an accused, there is no
reason to believe that the disclosures will be either unreliable or the product of
exploitation of cognizable inferiorities.
195. Of course, the DOJ would recognize a right to counsel if the deliberate
elicitation governed by Massiah doctrine, despite the lack of legal questions or expert
advocacy, jeopardized the integrity of the truth-seeking process. As noted before,
however, the DOJ has concluded that the governmental conduct regulated by
Massiahdoes not yield unreliable or inaccurate evidence that threatens to convict the
innocent. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
196. See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 294 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting):
If [the accused] voluntarily.., decides to disclose incriminating information to
someone whom he mistakenly believes will not report it to the authorities ...
he is normally accountable for his actions and must bear any adverse consequences that result .... [Tihe accused is free to keep quiet and to consult with
his attorney if he so chooses.
See also Tomkovicz, Defense of Massiah, supra note 9, at 62 n.247 (responding to the
claim that an accused ought to be smart enough to fend for herself in Massiah
situations).
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desirable effort to convict the guilty-in ways the framers did
not intend. When a defendant's inequality might be exploited,
the pursuit of truth must give way, but when there is no real
risk that the state might take unfair advantage of an inferior
opponent,
there is nothing to outweigh the preferred value of
197
truth.
When cast in such temperate terms, the case against
Massiah cannot be dismissed. It reflects a potentially legitimate interpretation of the sixth amendment, a worthy
competitor for the fair play defense of Massiah that I have
proffered. The differences between this rational critique of
Massiah and my defense of it are due to fundamentally different perceptions of the needs of accused individuals and of the
values implicated when the government seeks to elicit
inculpatory information. The defense of Massiah perceives
inferiority, inequality, and legitimate needs for counsel in
Massiah situations. As a result, it views the failure to accord
counsel as a threat to fair play and to the core values underlying our systemic commitment to fair play. The opposing view
sees no cognizable weakness or inequality, no need for
counsel's assistance, and, consequently, no unfairness or
betrayal of constitutional values when counsel is denied.
Having described and discussed the competing interpretations
of the sixth amendment that underlie the Massiah debate, I
will conclude by sketching the reasons I remain persuaded
that Massiah should survive.19

197. The same sort of reasoning seems to underlie Professor Grano's conclusion
that Massiah is not constitutionally defensible:
To say that discovery of truth must be primary is not to say that it must be the
only desideratum ....
If discovery of truth is the primary goal, however, the
rules of procedure will sacrifice truth only when necessary to accomplish other
goals of overriding importance. Too often, though, the American system ...
seems willing to sacrifice truth for ends that are not compelling and when the
necessity of sacrificing truth to accomplish such ends is little more than speculative.
... I would have thought that proving the defendant's guilt was precisely the
goal, at least absent a serious concern about convicting the innocent, condoning
or encouraging official misconduct, countenancing violations of the defendant's
dignity, or encouraging some other evil of comparable gravity.
Grano, supra note 12, at 403-04 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 410 (mentioning
the DOJ Report's argument that "Massiah and its progeny inhibit the discovery of
truth for reasons that [are not] compelling").
198. The objects of this Article do not require an exploration of the appropriate
doctrinal definition and boundaries of the Massiah right. I have proffered my views
concerning the appropriate doctrine at some length in two earlier works. See
Tomkovicz, Defense of Massiah, supra note 9, at 63-90 (examining doctrinal issues
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A pretrial Massiah-type right must find roots in the trial
right originally granted by the framers. It can be justified
only as a necessary temporal extension of that right. Therefore, in deciding whether the value choices underlying
Massiah are constitutionally defensible, it is critical to
determine whether they parallel those underlying trial
counsel. In my view, the right to equalizing trial counsel
afforded by our system supports the Massiah right and
undermines the position of Massiah's opponents. 199
To my knowledge, our system never has confined, and does
not now confine the role of trial counsel strictly to preventing
unreliability and providing solely legal knowledge and skill.
Trial counsel functions as a multipurpose equalizer who
provides whatever assistance and guidance the system
requires for a competent defense. The system permits, indeed,
encourages counsel to be a zealous advocate who furnishes
whatever types of strategic, tactical, practical, and legal aid
the situation demands. We do not, and would not, allow the
state to deny the assistance of counsel in a trial situation that
threatens to harm a defendant's chances to prevail simply
because the situation does not jeopardize reliability or call for
strictly legal skills.2"' Apparently, we view the accused at
trial as ill-equipped to cope with all aspects of his defense. He
needs and deserves assistance in making all choices posed by
the system and in conducting all dealings with his adversary.
Our conception of fair play at trial allows a defendant who is
confronted with an opponent determined to deprive him of
freedom and with a system designed to decide -whether the
deprivation is warranted to receive whatever assistance he
needs to defend himself. To withhold assistance for any

surrounding the scope of the right to counsel); Tomkovicz, Massiah Exclusion, supra
note 9, at 773-92 (examining doctrinal issues pertaining to the operation of the
Massiah exclusion).
199. 1 have developed this analogical analysis in more detail previously. See
Tomkovicz, Defense of Massiah, supra note 9, at 52-62.
200. One reason for our unwillingness to do so could be the sense that the
distinction between legal and nonlegal assistance is artificial or fallacious. It is true
that not all phases of the criminal justice process call for technical "legal" skills or
esoteric "legal" knowledge.
On the other hand, because every phase of the
adversarial contest has potential impact upon the outcome of the trial, the ability to
cope effectively with every phase does call for wisdom or skill or savvy or experience
that is "legal" in a more general sense. The distinction upon which the anti-Massiah
argument rests reflects an exceptionally stingy understanding of the nature of "legal"
assistance. Whether a defense decision is complex or simple, it is a legal decision in
the sense that it is integral to the resolution of a legal contest.
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important "nonlegal" decision would erode our commitment to
fair play and our underlying respect for the individual. It
would run contrary to our systemic unwillingness to take
advantage of the individual subjected to the awesome exercise
of governmental power that criminal accusation embodies. 0 1
I have suggested before that our system would not permit

201. The holding of Perry v. Leeke, 109 S. Ct. 594 (1989), does not suggest a
contrary understanding of the legitimacy of restrictions upon counsel's freedom to
assist the defendant. In fact, its reasoning suggests a view wholly supportive of that
explained in the text. In Perry, the majority held that a trial judge's order barring
consultation between an attorney and the defendant during a 15 minute recess at the
end of the defendant's direct testimony did not violate the sixth amendment. The
Court was careful to ensure that the authority to deny consultation between lawyer
and client was narrowly cabined. It indicated that the power to bar consultation was
limited to cases involving "brief recess[es] in which there is a virtual certainty that
any conversation between the witness [-defendant] and the lawyer would relate
exclusively to [the] ongoing testimony," id. at 596, and that the only time that a
"testifying defendant does not have a constitutional right to advice" is during "a short
recess in which it is appropriate to presume that nothing but the testimony will be
discussed," id. at 602.
The Perry Court's rationale for recognizing a limited authority to prohibit
consultation between an accused and his lawyer was that such consultation could
defeat the truth-seeking efficacy of cross-examination without protecting any
cognizable constitutional entitlement of the accused. The reason for limiting the
exception so strictly, however, was that consultation during longer recesses might
encompass matters that go beyond the content of the defendant's own
testimony-matters that the defendant does have a constitutional right to
discuss with his lawyer, such as the availability of other witnesses, trial tactics,
or even the possibility of negotiating a plea bargain. It is the defendant's right
to unrestricted access to his lawyer for advice on a variety of trial-related
matters that is controlling in the context of a long recess.
Id. at 602.
The Perry Court did not permit the denial of access to counsel because the
situation at issue posed no risk of unreliability and confronted the accused with no
"legal" questions. The basis for permitting a bar to access was that an accused has
no "constitutional right to advice" regarding his "ongoing testimony." Id. at 596, 602.
The expansive language used by the Court in explaining why access must be
unimpeded during longer recesses bears repeating. The Perry majority recognized
a "right to unrestricted access to his lawyer for advice on a variety of trial-related
matters," and "a constitutional right to discuss with his lawyer ... trial tactics." Id.
at 602 (emphasis added). That language suggests that the Court would not be
receptive to a claim that trial counsel's assistance can be denied in situations that
lack both threats to reliability and "legal" complexities. See id. at 606 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) ("Nowhere have we suggested that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
turns on what the defendant and his attorney discuss or at what point during a trial
their discussion takes place."); id. (suggesting that counsel might provide "a few
soothing words ... to the agitated or nervous defendant facing the awesome power
of the State"); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 857 (1975) ("[T]he right to the
assistance of counsel has been understood to mean that there can be no restrictions
upon the function of counsel in defending a criminal prosecution in accord with the
traditions of the adversary factfinding process that has been constitutionalized in the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.").
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the government to engage in uncounseled elicitation of an
accused's thoughts during the trial phase. In other words, we
would not tolerate unmonitored prosecutorial trial maneuvers
equivalent to those pretrial actions governed by Massiah. °2
If I am correct, it must be because the values underlying
Massiah are considered deserving of protection at trial. °3
The remaining question, therefore, is whether it is appropriate
to confine the pursuit of those values to the trial.
The case against such confinement is relatively simple. 0 4
If the framers, who lived in a world without pretrial confrontations between adversaries, 0 5 thought that certain ends were
worthy of pursuit at trial, it is difficult to believe that they
would tolerate state actions that jeopardize those same values
just prior to trial.0 6 Restriction of counsel to the trial would
permit the government, with a modicum of pretrial effort and
ingenuity, to circumvent the protection and eviscerate the
values that are sacred at trial.2 °7 It requires no legal sophistication to conclude that if the framers did constitutionalize

202. See Tomkovicz, Defense of Massiah, supra note 9, at 53-54. Nor would our
system accept the argument that even though the government has deprived the
accused of the entitlement to trial counsel's assistance in a situation analogous to
Massiah contexts, the trier should be allowed to hear and rely upon disclosures that
are the fruits of that deprivation. The right to trial counsel must include an integral
entitlement to exclude evidence yielded by depriving a defendant of assistance.
Without that exclusionary entitlement, the right to counsel would be hollow, for an
accused could be stripped of the substantive benefit of having counsel's assistance-i.e., protection against the enhanced risks of conviction that are the result of
unadvised decisions.
203. I see no reason to believe that the protection afforded for those "Massiah
values" at trial is an unavoidable by-product of excess caution regarding the restraint
of trial counsel, rather than the intended product of conscious constitutional choices
regarding the purposes and functions of trial counsel.
204. I have made the case before. See Tomkovicz, Defense of Massiah, supra note
9, at 55-60.
205. See Note, An Historical Argument for the Right to Counsel During Police
Interrogation,73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1041 (1964); see also United States v. Ash, 413 U.S.
300, 309-10 (1973) (recognizing that when the Bill of Rights was drafted the state did
not confront the accused until trial, whereas today the state confronts the accused
with significant pretrial events).
206. See Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 301-02 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that the obvious impropriety of the prosecution's private interview of a
defendant once trial is in progress supports the conclusion that a similar pretrial
interview is improper).
207. See Michigan v. Harvey, 110 S. Ct. 1176, 1184 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(recognizing that the right to counsel must be accorded in pretrial Massiah contexts
because "[a]ny lesser guarantee would provide insufficient protection against any
attempt by the State to supplant 'the public trial guaranteed by the Bill of Rights'
with a 'secret trial in the police precincts.'") (quoting Spano v. New York, 360 U.S.
315, 326 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring)).
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the fair play values described earlier, they would not have
been favorably disposed toward expedient restructuring of the
criminal process to undermine those values. If adversary
system fair play requires trial counsel to be a multipurpose
equalizer, then a modern criminal justice system that has
expanded the adversary contest into pretrial realms must
expand the entitlement to assistance into those realms to
ensure the preservation of fair play values. °8
Allow me to summarize. The Massiah doctrine reflects a
certain vision of fair play and the conclusion that the constitutional interest in adversarial fair play must sometimes
outweigh-and defeat-the quest for truth in criminal justice. °9 The constitutional value choices implicit in Massiah'svision of fair play seem to be reflected in the roles of trial
counsel and the kinds of assistance to which an accused is

208. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967) (observing that
pretrial confrontations are scrutinized to determine whether counsel is necessary to
preserve right to fair trial and to the effective assistance of trial counsel); Spano v.
New York, 360 U.S. 315, 326 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring) (arguing that if
interrogation of accused without counsel is permissible, trial in police station
supplants the trial guaranteed by the Bill of Rights); Crooker v. California, 357 U.S.
433, 443 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that the right to have pretrial
counsel is often necessary to protect the right to be heard at trial).
In keeping with the premises in the text, I have proposed a minimum standard for
determining whether to recognize a pretrial right to counsel:
In general, the sixth amendment requires counsel in any pretrial adversarial
encounter between government and accused if the encounter is essentially
equivalent to, and an effective substitute for, a trial encounter at which such
assistance would be required. In other words, if an encounter between a
defendant and the government adversary at trial would trigger the right to
counsel's equalizing assistance, the same kind of encounter between adversaries
before trial must trigger an identical constitutional right to assistance.
Tomkovicz, Defense of Massiah, supra note 9, at 59-60 (footnote omitted).
209. As Justice Brennan, for a majority of the Court, recently observed:
"There is no gainsaying that arriving at the truth is a fundamental goal of our
But
legal system." United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 (1980) ....
various constitutional rules limit the means by which the government may
conduct this search for truth in order to promote other values embraced by the
Framers and cherished throughout our Nation's history.
James v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 648, 651 (1990); see also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78,
113-14 (1970) (Black, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("A criminal trial is
in part a search for truth. But it is also a system designed to protect 'freedom'....
[Although the] task of convincing a jury that the defendant is guilty.... is made
more difficult by the Bill of Rights .... [that is so because t]he Framers decided that
the benefits to be derived from the kind of trial required by the Bill of Rights were
well worth any loss in 'efficiency' that resulted."); Rifkind, supra note 10, at 543
("With some trepidation I should like to tender the suggestion that in actual practice
the ascertainment of the truth is not necessarily the target of the trial, that values
other than truth frequently take precedence . . ").
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entitled at trial. If the same kinds of assistance are not
available beyond the strict confines of the trial, those constitutional value choices can be effectively frustrated. Because the
denial of assistance in Massiah contexts does threaten the
values at the core of the sixth amendment, a Massiah right to
counsel is constitutionally legitimate and necessary.21 °
III. CONCLUSION

The Massiah Report in the Truth in Criminal Justice Series
is a skillful advocate's indictment of one of the Warren Court's
less-noticed offenders.21 ' In responding to the Report, I have
commented upon both its form and content. I have suggested
that the Report's rhetorical approach to the debate over
Massiah, in particular its excessive, one-sided reliance upon
"truth," contains lessons for serious legal scholarship. I have
also observed that the substance beneath the Report's rhetoric
reflects sixth amendment value preferences that pose a serious
challenge to Massiah. In reflecting upon the character of the
Report, I hope to have contributed something to the way we
think about legal scholarship. In discussing its substance, I
hope to have accurately described the character of the Massiah
debate, and to have clarified the essence of the constitutional
choice posed by the opposing sides.
There is a plausible conception of sixth amendment values

210. Clearly, I disagree with the DOJ's view that "[s]uccess" against Massiah's
right to counsel and exclusionary mandate "would not impair the value of the sixth
amendment right to counsel at trial." REPORT No. 3, MASSLAH, supra note 7, at 666.
In the preceding discussion, I have indicated why I believe that a successful attack
on either the entitlement to counsel or the rule of exclusion would diminish the value
and erode the substance of the trial right upon which they are based.
211. See id. at 705 ("Massiah and its progeny seem to have received very little
public attention, and have not generated much controversy."). One reason Massiah
has always been a relatively unknown Warren Court offender (in contrast to such
doctrines as the fourth amendment exclusionary rule and Miranda)is that the Court
decided Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), shortly after Massiah. Massiah
receded into Miranda's very large shadow for a number of years. See Tomkovicz,
Defense of Massiah, supra note 9, at 3, 14-15. Another probable reason is that,
despite the DOJ's contrary protestations, see supra notes 68-69 and accompanying
text, Massiah does not pose substantial problems for effective law enforcement. See
supra note 156. In any event, if the Justice Department has its way, Massiah's
offenses will become well-publicized. See REPORT No. 3, MASSIAH, supra note 7, at
705 (noting the desirability of "making the Massiah doctrine a more visible public
issue").
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that can lead to rejection of the Massiah right. I reject that
conception, and its ultimate conclusion regarding Massiah,
because they rest upon premises about the abilities and needs
of defendants and upon a distinction between "legal" and other
types of assistance that I cannot accept. Moreover, they
contain implications for trial counsel that I find inconsistent
with the right that our system does and should recognize.
Nevertheless, the rational opposition to Massiah merits
serious consideration, for reasonable minds can disagree over
the constitutional legitimacy of the Massiahdoctrine. Perhaps
the best hope for the preceding discussion is that it will
encourage and enable debate that is more temperate, more
honest, and more informed.

